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Notes
The Indiana Business Takeover Act
INTRODUCTION

The prosperity of the Sixties developed a new form of corporate
investment. Corporations with large stores of retained earnings and
working capital were faced with little opportunity for expansion of
plants or facilities. As a result, these corporations began to invest
their excess capital by acquiring other corporations. Originally, the
most attractive means of acquisition was by merger with a smaller
firm after obtaining a favorable recommendation from the target
management.' Often, however, target managements were reluctant for
several reasons to approve such effort. In the case of an unfriendly
target management, the buyers then directed their efforts toward the
shareholders. In an approach called a tender offer, the emphasis shifts
to ownership as a means of control, with the acquiring corporation
offering to purchase for consideration the shares of the target company. The offer is normally made to all the shareholders of the target
company, and is often made despite opposition by the target management. The consideration is either the securities of the offeror or cash.
Tender offers have been regulated on both the federal and state levels.
On April 29, 1975, the General Assembly of the State of Indiana
enacted the Indiana Business Takeover Act. 2 The Act is a bold effort
by Indiana to regulate national tender offers for the stock of Indianabased companies. 8 This note explains the provisions of the Act, focuses
1 Target company is a term used in the general context to designate the company which
is to be acquired. Where the specific means of acquisition is a tender offer, the term is
defined in Indiana as a corporation or other issuer of securities which is organized in Indiana, has its principal place of business, or a substantial portion of its total assets within
the state. I=D. CODE § 23-2-3-1(j) (Burns Supp. 1976).
2 1975 Ind. Acts, P.L. 263 (April 29, 1975), amending IND. CODE § 23-2-1-1 et seq. (Burns
1971) [hereinafter referred to as the Indiana Act or the Act]. The Act is codified at IND.
CODE §§ 23-2-3-1 to 12 (Burns Supp. 1976). There is no legislative history to speak of. There
are no committee reports and no record of floor debates in either the House or the Senate.
3 The Indiana Act is most nearly like those of Wisconsin [Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 552
(West Supp. 1975)], Minnesota [M.INN. STAT. ANN. § 80B (Supp. 1975)], Colorado [Laws
1975, S.B. No. 284 (June 26, 1975), amending COL. REv. STAT. § 11-51.5-101 et seq. (1973),
Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH), 9151], South Dakota [S. DAK. CODIMFED LAWS § 47-32-1 et. seq.
(1976 Supp.)], and Ohio [OIo RFv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1974)]. Compare
also the "takeover" laws of Virginia [CODE OF VA. § 13.528 et. seq. (Rep. Vol. 1973)],
Nevada [REv. STAT. § 78.376 and § 78.377 (1973)], Kansas [K.S.A. § 17-1276 et. seq.
(1974)], Hawaii [HAwAn REV. STAT. § 22-417E (1975 Supp.)], Idaho [IDAHO CODE
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upon the jurisdictional and choice of laws problems, examines the
constitutional questions, and finally, offers some suggested statutory
solutions to the constitutional and jurisdictional problems which may
appear.
The Indiana Act
Before the Indiana Act 4 was passed, tender offers in Indiana
were regulated under the federal securities laws,5 Indiana securities
§ 30-1501 et seq. (1976 Supp.)], Utah [Laws 1976, S.B. No. 10 (February 5, 1976), Blue
Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
47,333.], and Delaware [DEL. CODE Title VIII ch. 1 subch. vi § 203
(1976 Supp.)]. In addition, New York has now also passed a similar statute. For a discussion of the New York act and the effect of all state acts on the securities market, see
Carter, Blocking Tender Offers With State Law, Wall St. J. Oct. 3, 1976, § F, at 18.
For a discussion of the Virginia statute, see Gibson & Freeman, Business Associations,
The Thirteenth Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 54 VA. L. Rxv. 1224 (1968). For a discussion of the Ohio statute, see Bromberg, Tender Offers: Safeguards and Restraints-An
Interest Analysis, 21 CAsE W. Rns. L. Ray. 613 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bromberg];
Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 722 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Shipman]; Sommer,
The Ohio Takeover Act: What Is It?, 21 CAsz W. RIs. L. Rav. 681 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Sommer].
4 A case has already arisen under the Indiana Act. On October 15, 1975, United Technologies Corp. (United) made a tender offer for the shares of Otis Elevator Co. (Otis),
which was to expire on October 27. The offer price was $42, while the prior close was $31.
On the sixteenth, only one day after the announcement of the offer, the Commissioner of
Securities of the State of Indiana issued a cease and desist order to United, prohibiting the
offer until United complied with the Indiana Act and until the Commisioner ruled pursuant
to the Act that the offer was effective. A hearing was held on the offer on October 22 to
determine whether United must comply with the Act. On October 27, the Commissioner
ruled that Otis was not a target company as defined by the Act, since it was neither incorporated in Indiana nor had its principal place of business or a substantial portion of its
assets within the state. As a result, United need not comply with the Act. Otis appealed
this ruling to the Marion County Superior Court, as provided by the Act. United removed
the appeal to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on the
basis of diversity of citizenship and federal question. On October 28, Otis moved to remand
the case back to the state court. This petition was granted and the case remanded on three
grounds: (1) the Commissioner is a necessary party to the appeal, because the appeal seeks
to reverse his order; (2) the eleventh amendment prohibits an action by the citizen of one
state (Otis is a citizen of New York and New Jersey) against another state (the Commissioner represents Indiana); and (3) this appeal is not within the original jurisdiction of
the federal court and therefore is not removable. Otis Elevator Co. v. Hafsten, Civil Action
#IP 75-619-C(So. D. Ind. October 30, 1975).
Meanwhile, on October 20, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York ordered United to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue
against its offer for violation of section 14(b) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d). On
October 29, the New York District Court enjoined the offer for violation of §§ 14(d) and
14(e) in falsely stating that United had no plans or proposals for possible merger of Otis'
assets. Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
United then withdrew its offer. While the appeal in the Indiana state court was pending,
the parties settled. On November 3, 1975, United issued a new offer, which eventually
succeeded. Copies of the relevant documents are on file at the INDiANA LAW JoURNAL.
5The federal securities laws, the Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter referred to as the
1933 Act] and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter referred to as the
1934 Act], are codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77 and 78 et seq., respectively.
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law,6 and, in the case of a domestic insurer, the provisions for regulation of domestic insurance companies. 7 Under the new Act, no person
may make a takeover offer involving a target company, unless the
takeover offer is "effective" within, or exempted by, the provision
of the Act, or by regulation or order of the Securities Commissioner.8
The literature on tender offers, particularly on the Williams Act, is vast. See E. ARAeow
& H. EnmRNoa,
TzNDER OFrRs POR CORPORATE Co=rroL (1973) [hereinafter cited as
ARAwow & EnrmoRN]; A. BROMBERG, SEcuRiTiEs LAw-FRAun §§ 6.1-6.6 (1967) [hereinafter cited as SEcuenEs LAw-FRAuD]; L. Loss, SEcuRTIrs REGuATioN, 3647-70 (1961);
Binder, The Securities Law of Contested Tender Offers, 18 N.Y.L.F. 569 (1973); Branson,
Some Suggestions From a Comparison of British and American Tender Offer Regulations,
56 CORNELL L. REv. 685 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Branson]; Bromberg, supra note 3;
Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 197o Amendments, 26 Bus. LAWYER 1637
(1971); Cohen, A Note On Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus.
LAWYER 149 (1966); Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisitions by Tender Offers, 115
U. PA. L. REv. 317 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Fleischer & Mundheim]; Gibson & Freeman, Business Associations: The Thirteenth Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 54 VA. L.
REV. 1224 (1968); Hamilton, Some Reflections On Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15
N.Y.L.F. 269 (1969); Hayes & Taussig, Tactics Of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HASv. Bus.
REv., March 1967 at 135 [hereinafter cited as Hayes & Taussig]; Henry, Activities o
ArbitrageursIn Tender Offers, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 466 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Henry];
Krasik, Tender Offers: The Target Company's Duty of Disclosure, 25 Bus. LAWYER 455
(1969); Mullaney, Guarding Against Takeovers-Defensive Charter Provisions, 25 Bus.
LAWYER 1441 (1970); O'Hanlon, Goodrich's Four-Ply Defense, FoRT NE, July 1969 at 110;
Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-over Bids-Defensive Tactics, 23 Bus. LAWYER 115 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Schmults & Kelly]; Shipman, supra note 3; Sommer, supra note 3;
Wooldridge, Some Defenses To Takeover Bids, 1974 J. or Bus. LAW 202 (1974); Yoran,
Advance Defensive Tactics Against Takeover Bids, 21 Am. J. or Come,. LAW 531 (1973);
Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HARV. L. REv. 377 (1969); Note, Judicial Control of Cash
Tender Offers-A Few Practical Recommendations, SO IND. L.J. 114 (1974); Note, Economic Realities of Cash Tender Offers, 20 MA= L. REv. 237 (1968); Note, The Courts
and the Williams Act: Try A Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 991 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Try a Little Tenderness]; Note, Commerce Clause Limitations Upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 So. CAL. L. REv. 1133 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Commerce
Clause Limitations]; Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Management In
Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STANFORD L. REv. 1104 (1969); Comment, Section 13(d)
and Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 853 (1971).
6
Securities regulation, particularly the registration requirements under Indiana law
may be found in IND. CODE §§ 23-2-1-1 to 20 (Burns Supp. 1976).
7 IND. CODE §§ 27-1-23-1 to 13 (Burns 1971). This chapter has a disclosure requirement very similar to, although not as extensive as, the disclosure required under the Indiana
Takeover Act In addition, hearings are authorized under the review powers of the Insurance Commissioner, who may rule on whether the offer is fair and equitable for the
offerees. The provisions of this section, of course, apply only to tender offers for the
shares of domestic insurers regulated under Title 27.
8IND CODE § 23-2-3-6 (a) (Burns Supp. 1976) provides that the Indiana Act shall be
administered by the secretary of state by and through the Commissioner of Securities
[hereinafter referred to as the Commissioner], who may exercise powers granted to him
under IND. CODE § 23-2-1 (Burns 1971). These include the power to deny, suspend, or
revoke the registration of a broker-dealer [defined in IND. CODE § 23-2-1-1(c) (Burns
1971)], where he finds the public interest warrants such action and the broker-dealer
has either violated a provision of IND. CODE § 23-2-1 (Burns 1971) [IND. CODE § 23-21-11(a)(2) (Burns Supp. 1976)] or engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the
securities business [IND. CODE § 23-2-1-11(a)(7) (Burns Supp. 1976)]. These powers may
be sufficiently broad to give the Commissioner the power to penalize a broker-dealer for
participation in an ineffective tender offer. Therefore, this power may be an indirect
means of influencing the acts of foreign offerors with minimal contacts with Indiana.
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A takeover offer 9 is defined as an offer to acquire any equity security1"
of a target company pursuant to a tender offer" or requests for

tenders, if after the acquisition the offeror12 will be the record or
beneficial owner of more than ten percent' 3 of the outstanding shares
of any class of equity securities. A target company is defined as any
corporation or other issuer of securities which is either organized

under the laws of the state of Indiana or has its principal place of4
business or a substantial portion of its total assets in the state.'
In addition, IND. CODE § 23-2-3-6(b) (Burns Supp. 1976), empowers the Commissioner
to promulgate regulations necessary to enforce the purpose of the Act under IND. CODE
§ 4-22-2 (Burns 1971).
9 IND. CODE § 23-2-3-1(i) (Burns Supp. 1976).

The definition of takeover offer does not include:
1) an offer effected by or through a broker-dealer in the ordinary course of his business. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-1(i) (a) (Bums Supp. 1976);
2) an offer for the shares of a company with fewer than one hundred record owners
at the time of the offer. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-1(i) (2) (Burns Supp. 1976);
3) an offer, if after the acquisition the total number of shares of the equity securities
of the target purchased within the last twelve months does not exceed two percent of the
total outstanding. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-1(i)(3) (Burns Supp. 1976);
4) an offer by the issuer to purchase its own shares. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-1(i) (4) (Bums
Supp. 1976);
5) an offer approved or initiated by the target company. IND CODE § 23-2-3-1(i) (5)
(Bums Supp. 1976); or
6) an offer determined by the Commissioner to be a takeover offer that is not made
for the purpose of acquiring control. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-1(i) (6) (Burns Supp. 1976).
Most of the above provisions are standard sections in the other state takeover acts.
Exemptions 3, 4, and 6 above are included in the Williams Act §§ 14(d) (8) (A-C), 15
U.S.C. §§ 78n(d) (8) (A-C) (1971). Note, however, that exemption 5 (the uncontested offer)
is not included in the Williams Act. This provision is decidedly pro-management, since it
is unclear that the informational needs of the offerees are significantly less in uncontested
offers.
10 IND CODE § 23-2-3-1(i) (Burns Supp. 1976) Equity security is defined in IND. CODE
§ 23-2-3-1(e) (Burns Supp. 1976) in a way which focuses on the voting power of the
target company. For example, common stock, any security convertible into common, or
any other security may be deemed by the Commissioner an equity security for the
protection of investors.
1"Tender offer" was intentionally left undefined in the Indiana and federal statutes.
The definition is to be made judicially on a case-by-case basis in conformity with the
policy of the statute. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 598 (5th Cir. 1974).
See Brown, The Scope of the Williams Act and Its 197o Amendments, 26 Bus. LAwYE
1637, 1643-44 (1971); Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 fARv. L. Rav. 377, 388-89 (1969)
[for further discussion of the definition of tender offer].
12 "Offeror" is defined at IND. CODE § 23-2-3-1(f) (Burns Supp. 1976) as including
any individual or company who is making the tender offer for the securities of the shareholders of the target company.
18 Compare the Williams Act § 14(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1971), where disclosure is required if five percent of the outstanding shares will be owned after acquisition
pursuant to the tender offer. In the usual tender offer transaction, the offeror will acquire
shares on the open market up to a level just short of the five percent figure. Then, the
tender offeror will announce his bid to acquire well over ten percent of the shares. Thus,
an offeror will normally comply with the more restrictive federal percentage as a guideline for the time when disclosure is required.
14 IND. CODE 23-2-3-1(j) (Burns Supp. 1976).
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Consequently, the Indiana Act purports to be extraterritorial in effect
since it affects out of state shareholders and national corporations.1 5
A takeover offer becomes effective twenty days after a disclosure
statement18 is filed by Indiana counsel with the Commissioner,1 7 unless
15

Unlike the Blue-Sky laws, which are territorial in effect, the Indiana Takeover Act

purports to regulate on a national basis any tender offer for Indiana-based companies.
Consequently, difficulties such as commerce clause limitations and jurisdictional problems
arise under the Indiana Act. See text accompanying notes 120-181 (commerce clause) and
49-1196 (jurisdictional problems) infra.
1 IND. CODE 23-2-3-2(e) (Burns Supp. 1976). Federal law requires disclosure under
Section 13(d) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1971). The section requires disclosure of:
1) the background and identity of the offeror. Williams Act § 13(d) (1) (A), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d) (1) (A) (1971);
2) the source and amount of funds used in the tender offer, including in particular
a description of the borrowing transaction if any funds are obtained on credit. Williams
Act § 13(d)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1) (B) (1971) ;
3) any plans or proposals the offeror may have to sell, liquidate, or merge the assets
of the target company, if the purpose of the offer is to acquire control. Williams Act
§ 13(d) (1) (C), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1) (C) (1971);
4) the number of shares the offeror currently owns or has a right to acquire. Williams
Act § 13(d) (1) (D), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1) (D) (1971);
5) any information as to any contracts, arangements, or understandings the offeror
has with any person concerning the shares of the target company. Williams Act § 13(d) (1)
(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1) (E) (1971); and
6) any information required by the rules asd regulations of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Williams Act § 13(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1) (1971).
Pursuant to part (6) above, the SEC issued Reg. § 240.13d-101, requiring disclosure of
the following additional information:
1. a description of the offeror's business, a description of its properties, a
description of any pending legal and administrative proceedings in which the offeror
has recently been a party, and the names, addresses, material business activities,
and affiliations in the recent years of all the offeror's directors and executive officers;
2. information as to any contract, arrangements, understandings, or negotiations with any major employee or record or beneficial owner of the target company with respect to the tender offer, the purchase by the offeror from such
person otherwise than pursuant to the offer, the retention of any person in his
present position or any other position, or the giving or withholding of a favorable recommendation; and
3. a description of the provisions made for disclosure to the offerees.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1975).
The disclosure provisions of the Indiana Act are virtually identical. IND. CODE §§ 23-23-2(i) (1-7) (Burns Supp. 1976). As a result, full compliance with the disclosure requirements
of the Williams Act can be achieved by compliance with the provisions of the Indiana Act.
The similarity between the disclosure required under the two acts is strong testimony that the
purpose of the Indiana Act is identical to that of the federal act--disclosure for the
protection of investors. The sole difference in the disclosure sections of the Indiana and
Williams Acts is that full disclosure is only made to the SEC under the Williams Act.
Under the Indiana Act, a copy of the disclosure statement must also be sent to the
target company as the representative of the offerees. This may sound like a great
advantage for the target company. The advantage, however, is at most of minimum
value, since the target company is at best saved a trip to the SEC to obtain a copy.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1971); IND. CODE § 23-2-3-2(b) (Burns Supp. 1976).
17 ID. CoDF § 23-2-3-2(e) (Burns Supp. 1976). Under the Williams Act § 14(d) (1),
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1) (1971), the offer may become effective at any time after disclosure is made. On the other hand, if the tender offer requires the issuance of securities
as part of an exchange offer, then the registration requirements of the 1933 Act must be
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the Commissioner orders a hearing."8 The offeror must also send a
copy of the disclosure statement to the target company and publicly
disclose by press release to the leading financial wire services the material terms of the offer no later than the date of the filing.1"
The Indiana Act also requires that an effective takeover offer
contain certain provisions. First, offeree shareholders must have a
right to withdraw all tendered shares at any time until three days
before the expiration of the offer.2" Second, if the offer is for less
than all the outstanding shares and a greater number of shares is
tendered than the offeror has promised or is willing to accept, the offer
must accept the tenders pro rata.2 Third, if the offeror, during the
period of the offer, varies its terms by increasing the consideration,
he must also pay the increased consideration to all shareholders who
tendered before the increase. 22 Fourth, no offer is allowed during the
pendency of any administrative or injunctive proceeding brought by
met. Under § 8 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1971), a ten-day advance filing of
a disclosure statement to the SEC is required. The twenty-day advance filing is also
required under the Indiana Act. Thus, an offeror may fully comply with all the registration filing requirements of the Williams Act by complying with the more stringent requirements imposed by the Indiana Act and the 1933 Act.
18The Commissioner may, in the interests of the offerees, accelerate the effectiveness
of the offer if the target company consents and all the provisions of the Act have otherwise been met. Except for the provision requiring the approval of the target company,
this feature is very appealing, and meets some of the criticism which may be directed at
the Act's effects on the timing of tender offers. For example, if the Commissioner were
satisfied with the equity and fairness of the tender offer, he could then allow the
mechanisms of the Act to move at a faster pace. In this way, the time advantage, the
principal asset of the offeror, could be restored in bona fide offers. This discretion in the
hands of the Commissioner may be necessary in order that the Act function fairly.
See text accompanying notes 235-36 infra.
Unlike the Indiana Act, the Williams Act requires judicial enforcement. However,
administrative enforcement is no unique provision, since the SEC is empowered to enforce
the mechanics of the 1933 Act requirements for the registration of a public offering of
securities. § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1971).
19 IND. CODE § 23-2-3-2(b) (Burns Supp. 1976).
20
IND. CODE § 23-2-3-5(a) (Burns Supp. 1976). Compare Williams Act §14(d)(5),
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (5) (1971), which requires that the offerees have the right to withdraw any tender for the first seven days after the announcement of the offer, or at any
time more than sixty days after the announcement. For offers lasting from one to ten
days or over sixty days, compliance with the federal withdrawal provision will at least
satisfy the requirements under the Indiana Act. For all other offer periods, the opposite
is true.
21 IND. CODE § 23-2-3-5(b) (Bums Supp. 1976). Compare Williams Act § 14(d)(6),
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1971). The section requires pro rata acceptance of tenders received in the first ten days if those tenders exceed the number the offeror is bound or
willing to accept. As a result, if an offeror complies with the Indiana Act by agreeing
to pro rata acceptance of all shares tendered regardless of the time of receipt, the offeror
will have also complied with the provisions of the Williams Act. Note that the offeror
need not accept fractional shares.
22
IND. CODE § 23-2-3-5(c) (Burns Supp. 1976). This is a standard provision of all
other state acts and the Williams Act § 14(d)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1971).
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the Commissioner against the offeror for any violation of the Act.2'
Finally, the offer must be made to Indiana shareholders on the same
basis as it is made to all other shareholders. 4
In addition, the Commissioner may order a hearing in his discretion
for the protection of the offerees, and shall order a hearing upon the
request of the target company.25 A hearing must be ordered before
the offer becomes effective, that is, within twenty days after filing.2
The hearing must begin within twenty days after the order.2 The ruling
by the Commissioner must follow within sixty days the conclusion
of the hearing.2 8 In the ruling, the Commissioner must decide three
major issues: 1)whether the disclosure statement gives full and fair
disclosure of all material information required by the Act ;' 2) whether
the offer is fair and equitable to the offerees; ° and 3) whether the offer
28 IND. CODE § 23-2-3-5(d) (Burns Supp. 1976). This section is modelled on similar
provisions in the Wisconsin [Wisc. STAT. ANx. § 552.11(5) (West Supp. 1975)] and Minne24IN. CODE § 23-2-3-5(e) (Burns Supp. 1976). Only Virginia, Delaware, and Nevada
have no similar requirement. Note that, although the federal statute does not expressly proor amended offer while contesting the validity of the first attempt
hibit discrimination, discriminatory offers would nonetheless appear to conflict with the
spirit of the Williams Act. Cf. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp.,
394 F. Supp. 267, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Bromberg, supra note 5, at 663-64.
25
1ID. CODE § 23-2-3-2(e) (Burns Supp. 1976). On the other hand, the Williams Act
provides for judicial enforcement, leaving the SEC with only a rulemaking function.
However, under section 8(b) of the 1933 Act, the SEC may order a hearing, delay
effectiveness, or demand a correction for the protection of investors. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(b)
(1971). In addition, the SEC may issue a stop order, prohibiting offers under an improper registration. 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1971). Consequently, the powers granted the
SEC under the 1933 Act are remarkably similar to those given to the Indiana Commissioner.
2
6The Commissioner has power only to accelerate or delay effectiveness. IND. CODE
§23-2-3-2(e) (Burns Supp. 1976). The implication is therefore clear that he cannot
cancel effectiveness of an offer by ordering a hearing. Once effective, the offer must confederal legislation. It prevents an offeror in violation of the Act from proposing a new
tinue. It may not be stopped.
27
-IND.CODE § 23-2-3-2(f) (Burns Supp. 1976).
28Id.
29
wD. CODE § 23-2-3-2(f) (Burns Supp. 1976). This ruling is guided by the concept.
sota [Mnmn. STAT. ANN. § 80B.03(5) (Supp. 1975)] statutes, but was not included in the
that disclosure must be made to ensure an intelligent investor decision on the tender,
since the investor's dilemma is the focal point of all takeover legislation.
soId. The power to determine whether the offer is fair and equitable for the offerees
is generally derived from the securities laws of the state. See notes 237-38 infra. In
Indiana, the securities regulations do not expressly authorize such a determination in the
registration process. Under Ib. CODE § 23-2-1-7 (a) (1) (Burns Supp. 1976), a review of
the fairness of the disdosure is authorized. Similarly, under § 23-2-1-7(a) (8), the Commissioner can deny registration when "the offering has worked or tended to work a fraud
on the purchaser, or would so operate." In addition, under the insurance provisions, a
determination whether the offer is fair and equitable for the offerees is expressly authorized.
I D. CODE § 27-1-23-2 (d) (1) (iv) (1971).
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is to be made to all shareholders on substantially equal terms. 31 Appeal
of the Commissioner's ruling is of course allowed.32
Finally, the Act contains a general antifraud provision,' and a
provision specifically covering fraudulent recommendations and solicitations. 4 Criminal35 and civil" liability is imposed for violations of the pro31 IND. CODE § 23-2-3-2(f) (Burns Supp. 1976). In contrast, under the federal regulatory scheme, the SEC under the 1933 Act and the courts under the Williams Act amendments to the 1934 Act are only allowed to review the completeness of the disclosure. The
federal statutes are predicated on the premise that full disclosure is sufficient protection for
the average investor. The Indiana Act, however, requires the Commissioner to judge the
substantive fairness of the offer. This is a function that is not granted to either the SEC
or the courts under the federal statutes. Thus, this grant of power represents a significant
deviation from the plan of federal regulation.
32 IND. CODE § 23-2-3-11 (Burns Supp. 1976). An appeal of the Commissioner's ruling
may be made by any party to the circuit or superior court of the county in which the
target has its principal office, or Marion county. A trial de novo is held with precedence
in time over all other disputes pending in that court. However, an appeal will not in
itself affect the efficacy of the ruling during the pendency of the appeal, unless the court
stays the ruling. In general, the ruling of the Commissioner has a "presumptive effect,"
and the ruling will be effective during the appeal. Thus, if the Commissioner should rule
in favor of the offer, the offer will continue to be effective during the appeal period. See
also the discussion in the text accompanying notes 233-36, infra.
33
IND. CODE 23-2-3-4 (Burns Supp. 1976). The antifraud provision prohibits any
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act in connection with a takeover, including without limitation:
a) participation in a takeover not effective or exempted under the Act. IND. CODE
§ 23-2-3-4(a) (Burns Supp. 1976);
b) sale by any official of the target company at a price higher than the offer price,
unless at the existing market price. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-4(c) (Burns Supp. 1976);
c) publication or use in connection with the offer of any untrue statement or misleading omission of a material fact. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-4(b) (Burns Supp. 1976); and
d) acquisitions by the offeror alongside the offer. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-4(d) (Burns
Supp. 1976).
A general antifraud provision similar to the above provisions is included in the Williams
Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1971).
In addition, the Indiana Act also requires that copies of all publications, advertisements, and letters sent by either the target company or the offeror, soliciting or requesting
acceptance or rejection of the offer, must be filed with the Commissioner and sent to the
opposite party at least three full business days before release to the offerees.
34
IND. CODE § 23-2-3-3(a) (Burns Supp. 1976). An additional antifraud provision is
specifically attached to § 23-2-3-3(a). IND. CODE § 23-2-3-3(b) (Burns Supp. 1976).
85
IND. CODE § 23-2-3-9 (Burns Supp. 1976). Section (9) provides criminal liability
for the following violations:
1) for failure to file a disclosure statement required by the Act, the penalty is imprisonment of up to one year or a fine of up to $5000, or both. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-9(a)
(Burns Supp. 1976);
2) for intentional representation of a material fact known to be false or intentional
omission of a material fact known to be necessary to make other representations to the
Commissioner not misleading, the penalty is imprisonment of one to five years or a fine
of up to $10,000, or both. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-9(b) (Burns Supp. 1976);
3) for intentional publication of a material fact known to be false or intentional
omission of a material fact known to be necessary to make other representations in a
publication by or for him not misleading, the penalty is 1-5 years imprisonment or a fine
of up to $10,000, or both. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-9(c) (Burns Supp. 1976); and
4) for any knowing violation of any other provision for which a criminal penalty
has not otherwise been provided, the penalty is imprisonment of up to one year or a fine
of up to $1000, or both. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-9(d) (Burns Supp. 1976).
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visions of the Act. In order to ensure enforcement of the Act, the
Commissioner is not only granted broad investigatory and administrative powers, 7 but is also authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to effectuate the purpose of the legislation."8
The Federal Securities Laws
The relevant federal securities laws are embodied in the Securities
Act of 1933"9 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' The 1933
Act contains the requirements for registration of offering transactions.
In an exchange tender offer, the shares of the offeror company are
exchanged for the shares of the target company. As a result, the exchange offer includes an issuance of shares by the offeror, which must
comply with the 1933 Act. Since the offerees become new shareholders
in the offeror's company, the imposition of the full disclosure requirements of the 1933 Act is clearly justified in the interest of offeree
36 IND. CODE § 23-2-3-10 (Burns Supp. 1976). The Act provides that any offeror who
purchases an equity security by a takeover offer not in compliance with the Act or by
means of a false statement or misleading omission of a material fact, shall be liable to
his seller. The seller may, upon tender of consideration, recover the security plus any
income received by the purchaser, or damages, plus expenses. Damages are measured by
the difference bftween the larger of the market value at the date of the purchase by the
offeror or its present value and the persent value of the consideration paid by the offeror
at the tender. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-10(a) (1-2) (Burns Supp. 1976).
Similarly, although a shareholder has not tendered, he may sue for civil remedy, but
may recover only damages plus expenses. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-10(b) (Burns Supp. 1976).
The three year statute of limitations on all civil remedies does not begin to run until
discovery. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-10(d) (Burns Supp. 1976). In addition, the principal of a
violator of the Act or any agent assisting in a violation of the Act by his principal is
jointly and severally liable to the same extent as the violator. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-10(c)
(Burns Supp. 1976).
37IND. CODE §23-2-3-8(a) (Burns Supp. 1976). The Commissioner may investigate
and, if necessary, issue cease and desist orders for any actual or suspected violation of
the Act. Moreover, he may sue with full subpoena powers to enjoin any violations. Upon
a proper showing, a court may grant a preliminary or permanent injunction or temporary
restraining order, or may order rescission of any sale, purchase, or tender determined to be
unlawful under the Act. Id.
In addition, the offeror, target company, or any record or beneficial owner of any
target equity security may sue to enjoin a violation. Upon a proper showing, the court
may order any of the above remedies. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-8(b) (Burns Supp. 1976). For a
discussion of the standing problem under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
and the Williams Act, see Binder, The Securities Law of Contested Tender Offers, 18
N.Y.L.F. 569 (1973).
Exempted from regulation are domestic insurers regulated under Title 27, financial
institutions regulated by the department of financial institutions under Title 28, corporations regulated by the Public Service Commission, bank holding companies, public utilities,
public utility holding companies, national banking associations, and any savings and loan
association subject to regulation by a federal agency. IND. CODE § 23-2-3-12 (Burns Supp.
1976).
38IND. CODE § 23-2-3-6(b) (Burns Supp. 1976).
39
The 1933 Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77 et seq. (1971).
40 The 1934 Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 et seq. (1971).
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protection. The Indiana Act has offeree protection provisions surprisingly similar to those embodied in the 1933 Act, the most important
of which are advance notice filing provisions and administrative enforcement.4 1 Since the Indiana Act also regulates cash offers, the Act
can be viewed as simply extending to all tender offers a scheme of
regulation similar to that already imposed by federal law on exchange
offers. Thus, the provisions of the Indiana Act are neither revolutionary nor unique. Whereas the 1933 Act registers the sale of securities to the public, the Indiana Act registers the purchase of the securities from the public.
However, the 1968 Williams Act amendments to the 1934 Act42
provide the federal regulatory provisions for cash tender offers. The
disclosure and shareholder protection provisions are far less stringent
than those incorporated into the 1933 Act or the Indiana Act. Even
though the congressional purpose in enacting the Williams Act was to
increase investor protection during cash tender offers, Congress was
determined to balance the interests of the offeror and target companies.
The legislative history of the Williams Act can provide some insight.
For example, in his comments introducing the bill, Senator Williams
said,
I have taken extreme care with this legislation to balance the scales
equally to protect the legitimate interests of the corporation, management, and shareholders without unduly impeding cash takeover bids.
Every effort has been made to avoid tipping the balance of regulatory
burden in favor of management or in favor of the offeror. The purpose of this bill is to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit
of stockholders while at the same time providing the offeror
and
48
management equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
41 See notes 16-17, supra (advance notice) and notes 8, 18, 28, 30-31, supra (SEC's
power to review) & text accompanying.
42 The Williams Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454, amending 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m and 78n (1971) is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d), 78n(d) and 78n(e)
(1971). In addition to requirements of the Williams Act, Rule 10(b)-5, promulgated by
the SEC under the 1934 Act, also provides a private right of action to remedy fraudulent
or misleading actions in connection with the sale or purchase of securities. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1ob-5 (1975).

48

113 CONG. REc. 854-55 (1967). See also 113 CoNG. Rac. 24665-66 (1967)

[floor

discussion between Senators Javits and Williams on the purpose and effects of the Williams
Act]. The House Report also adds further insight into the purpose of the Williams Act.
It was urged during the hearings that takeover bids should not be discouraged
because they serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but inefficient management. It was also recognized that these bids are made for many
other reasons, and do not always reflect a desire to improve the management of
the company. The bill avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of
management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. It is designed to
require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time
providing the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
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Therefore, the purpose of the Williams Act was to protect investors
without making the statute a weapon for incumbent management.
However, if the Williams Act was designed to protect shareholders,
why were its provisions far less stringent than those imposed by the
1933 Act, when thirty-five years of close regulation of securities
transactions had followed the passage of the 1933 Act before Congress
enacted the Williams Act? For example, if Congress enacted less
stringent regulation of cash offers because such regulation would not
be beneficial to cash offers, then further regulation would seem to be
precluded by the enactment of the Williams Act. Three bases of
justification underlie this view. First, since cash offers proceed with
While the bill may discourage tender offers or other attempts to acquire
control by some who are unwilling to expose themselves to the light of disclosure,
the committee believes this is a small price to pay for adequate investor protection.
H.R. Rep. 1711, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. (1968), 1968 U.S. CODE, CONG. & AD. NEws 2811,
2813. The purpose of the Williams Act was therefore to protect investors without making
the statute a weapon for incumbent management.
In order to fully understand the role the Williams Act plays in the entire federal
regulatory scheme, one must understand the two major pieces of legislation-The 1933
and 1934 Acts. They were enacted to protect investors from fraudulent offerings of securities in illusory companies and to ensure the basic integrity of securities exchanges. The
purpose of the 1930's acts was to instill in consumers a feeling of confidence in the basic
fairness of securities transactions. The Williams Act has not changed that. As a result,
in a post-Williams Act case, the Supreme Court quoted with approval its language in
a pre-Williams Act decision. The Court said that the 1934 Act (which the Williams Act
amends) embraces a ". . . fundamental purpose . . . to substitute a philosophy of full
disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
business ethics in the securities industry." Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 150 (1971) quoting from SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180,
186 (1963).
In an exchange between a major corporation and a mass of small investors, the
distribution of information will naturally be unequal, especially because the offerees are
uncertain of the future of the target. See Bromberg, supra note 3, at 661-62. The purpose
of the Williams Act disclosure provisions was to remedy the unequal distribution. Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1971); Note, The Courts and the Williams
Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 991, 994 (1973). Thus, the standard for
disclosure is sufficient information so that the investor's decision will be predicated upon
a knowledgeably and informed evaluation of the alternatives. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co.
v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). This standard is
defined to be material information. For a discussion and comment on the standard for
material information, see Note, Judical Control of Cash Tender Offers-A Few Practical
Recommendations, 50 IND. L.J. 114, 122-30 (1974). However, the disclosure rules must
not be too restrictively construed.
Congress intended to assure basic honesty and fair dealing, not to impose an unrealistic requirement of laboratory conditions that might make the new statute
a potent tool for incumbent management to protect its own interests against the
desires and welfare of the shareholders.
Electronic Specialty Co. v. Int'l Control Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 948 (2nd Cir. 1969).
Similarly, in Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th
Cir. 1970), the court said:
The person or corporation filing a Schedule 13D statement need not necessarily
walk a tortuous path. He must, of course, be precise and forthright in making
full and fair disclosure as to all material facts ....
Id. at 1085.
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speed and surprise, delaying regulation would be detrimental to cash
offers.

Second, the most obvious justification may be that the offerees in
a cash offer have interests far less substantial than those of offerees
in an exchange offer, since cash offerees do not acquire new shares, but
rather receive cash. The cash offer transaction is a disinvestment on
the part of these offerees, rather than an investment in a new company.
Thus, they may require less protection than an offeree who is acquiring
new shares by exchange. However, this view is somewhat fallacious.
Under the Williams Act and especially under the Indiana Act, there is
a strong risk of minority stockholder status through pro rata acceptance.4r For example, in a successful bid, many offerees will become
minority shareholders in a company under new control, because only
a portion of their tenders can be accepted. Consequently, they are
"4acquiring" a small number of shares in a "new" company controlled
by the offeror and, therefore, they deserve the protection afforded
offerees under the 1933 Act. The risk of minority shareholder status
is especially pressing when one realizes that a stockholder who strongly
fears the results of a successful tender offer will wish to tender. Such
action only increases the number of shares tendered, which strengthens
the likelihood of pro rata acceptance of a large number of tenders.
Consequently, the only safe protection for an investor who fears the
success of an unfavorable tender offer is to sell his stock in the open
market. 40 This is the only sure way to avoid any risk of minority
44
However, there is evidence that such regulation would not be detrimental to cash
offers. Under the British scheme of tender offer regulation, which slows the otherwise
speedy progress of a tender offer, offerees have more confidence in the fairness of the
offer. That confidence has made tender offers more likely to succeed, because the offerees
are not committed to an opposition based on mistrust. In addition, experience has shown
that the passage of the 1933 and 1934 Acts has increased consumer confidence, which
has increased consumer investment in corporate securities. See Branson, supra note 5.
457he pro rata acceptance requirements under the federal and Indiana statutes are
discussed in the text accompanying note 21, supra. The risk of pro rata acceptance is
much smaller under the federal statute, where pro rata acceptance is required only for
the first ten days. Thus, only those stockholders who tardily tender risk having their
tenders completely refused. However, under the Indiana Act, the risk is more pressing.
Pro rata acceptance is required of all shares tendered. Thus, all current stockholders risk
the chance of becoming holders of a very small minority of shares in a radically different
company, which is the price paid under the Indiana Act for the freedom from the cohesion
to make a quick decision. This "new" investment is a very risky one. Thus, the offerees
need full disclosure of the intentions of the new management in order to make a wise
decision and adequate protections in order to execute it.
4aT e offerees face a serious dilemma. The more frightful the offeror looks as a
potential majority shareholder, the greater is the offeree's fear of minority shareholder
status, and the more likely the offeree will tender his shares, a reaction which will only
encourage the success of the offer, require pro rata acceptance, and thereby ensure
minority status. Of course, the offeree can refuse to tender so as to defeat the offer. What
then of the other offerees? What if they have sufficiently tendered so as to make the offer a
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shareholder status. As a seller in the open market to the highly
sophisticated group of arbitrageurs, the average offeree will need sufficient information on which to base his decision and adequate protection
in order to execute it."' The Indiana Act attempts to provide the
average offeree with this information and this protection.
Third, while in passing the Williams Act Congress may have intended only to authorize some minimum amount of control to increase
investor protection, it was most concerned with maintaining a balance
between the offeror and the target. In other words, Congress may not
have felt that certain regulatory provisions would be detrimental to
tender offers. Instead, Congress may have believed that inclusion of
specific provisions would simply have shifted the balance toward incumbent management. If this justification is indeed correct, then the Congressional opposition to certain regulatory provisions focused more upon
their effect on the balance between the offeror and target management.
Indeed, most of the regulatory provisions included in the Indiana Act
but not in the Williams Act emphasize offeree protection, rather than
discouraging the use under fair conditions of tender offers. Accordingly, any constitutional analysis of a state act under the Supremacy
Clause should focus upon its effect on this balance. A state may then
permissibly48 increase the regulation so long aa the balance is maintained. Evidence will also be presented to support this view.
In comparison to the federal statutes, then, the Indiana Act may be
viewed as a mirror of the 1933 Act, applied to all tender offers. In
some respects, the Act is not at all unique and simply parallels the
registration requirements of the 1933 Act. However, the regulation
success? The offeree who held out is then left in the cold. Consequently, the only sure remedy
is to sell the shares in the open market to the professional arbitrageurs. As a result, the
oflerees are not only confronted with what is tantamount to a forced sale of their shares, but
also with a sale position at a decided disadvantage to that of the horde of arbitrageurs
who make an attractive living trading on these arrangements.
47
The information needed by the offerees is of three types. First, the offeree must
decide if he personally likes the prospects of the offerors as a majority shareholder in
control Will the offeror enhance his investment? Or will his investment be sacrificed to
the whims of the majority? Second, the offeree must make a decision on the perceived
success of the offer. Of course, the offeror cannot be compelled to divulge the acceptance rate of the offer. However, if the offeree has adequate information, he can at
least judge for himself what he feels the other offerees perceive to be the chances for
success. Finally, if the offeree dislikes the offeror as a prospective majority stockholder
in control, even if the offeree is uncertain of the offer's success, he will choose to sell
his shares in the marketplace. See note 46, supra. Since the offeree is then forced to deal
with a large group of professional speculators, he deserves adequate disclosure of the
terms of the offer. In this way, at least some of the informational gap between the
offerees and the professionals will be closed.
48 See generaly notes 182-259, infra, and text accompanying.
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of cash offers is a significant departure from the provisions of the
Williams Act.
LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION

Takeover legislation such as the Indiana Act is unusual" because
of its extraterritorial approach to regulating tender offers. The Indiana
Act seeks to regulate all offers made within and without the state if
the target company is organized under Indiana law, or has its principal place of business, or a substantial portion of its total assets in
Indiana. 50 The Act does not assert its control upon a strict territorial
blue sky approach 5 ' of regulating only offers made within the state;2
it asserts extraterritorial control by prohibiting takeover offers involving target corporations unless the offer is "effective" under the Act."'
Since the Act regulates not only domestic corporations, but also
foreign corporations having their principle place of business or a
substantial portion of their total assets within the state, the extraterritorial nature of the Act may have a disruptive effect upon these
corporations. A "nightmare" situation is foreseeable in which two
boards of directors claim control of a corporation because the offeror
made a successful tender offer which was not "effective" under the
Indiana Act but which was recognized by the state of incorporation of
the target. 4 Should this disruption become so great that a need for
4

9
Takeover legislation is unusual because tender offers involve a solicitation to sell
shares which is closely analogous to solicitation to purchase shares which are governed
by state blue sky laws. See Reese & Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs:
Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 CoLuma. L. REv. 1118, 3137
[hereinafter cited as Reese & Kaufman]. Yet they have the effect of shifting corporate
control, a matter which is usually regulated by the state of incorporation. See text accompanying notes 82-87. Cf. Shipman, supra note 3.
50 IND. CODE § 23-2-3-1(j) (Burns Supp. 1976). In litigation, the statutory language
of "substantial portion of total assets" has been construed to require that the Indiana
based assets represent a substantial amount in proportion to the total assets of the target,
and not merely that the Indiana based assets amount to a substantial dollar value. United
Technologies v. Otis Elevator, Ind. Sec. Comm'r ruling [on file with the INDLNA LAW

JOURNAL.]

51 Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 5, at 1153. The Supreme Court has held
this type of regulation to be constitutional. See, Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539,
550-51 (1917). See generally L. Loss & E. CowErr, BLUE SKY LAW (1958).
52
A territorially based takeover act would be ineffective. "If the state were to regulate all tender offers to its residents for their stock in all corporations wherever located,
offerors could simply avoid soliciting in those states." Local shareholders could sell on the
open market for slightly less than the amount of the offer (the offer causing the stock to
rise in valuation). Arbitrageurs would then probably buy the shares and tender them to
the offeror. The effect would only be to deny local shareholders the full premium price.
ARANOw & EINHORN, supra note 5, at 157, 158.
58 IND. CODE § 23-2-3-2 (Burns Supp. 1976).
64 It is also likely that the offer may be controlled by the law of several states.
Delaware has recently promulgated a tender offer law which controls only those offers
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national uniformity is felt, this need could be fulfilled by either constitutional prohibition under the fourteenth amendment due process
clause, the full faith and credit clause, or the commerce clause, federal
pre-emption of the field or national incorporation. 5
To determine whether Indiana has legislative jurisdiction" it is
necessary to decide what the purpose of the statute is, so as to determine whether the state has a sufficient interest to meet constitutional
requirements. There appear to be at least two possible interests: (1)
protection of Indiana industry and (2) shareholder protection.17 However, the protection of Indiana industry and the concomitant protection
of both employment and tax revenues deriving therefrom raise serious
constitutional questions under the commerce clause.58 The normal
purpose of takeover legislation is shareholder protection. 9 The Indiana
made for targets incorporated under Delaware law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203, ch. I,
subchapter VI (1976). The practical result of a combination of laws such as that of
Indiana and Delaware is that the offeror will be confronted with defensive litigation in
several states whose acts require varying degrees and methods of disclosure.
55

See Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. Rav.

433, 479-80 (1968). The constitutional problems will be discussed infra.

56 [T]he effect to be given to the law of a sister state generally turns on whether
the state itself has the right to reach and govern a particular transaction, or
property, or person, because of some relationship which confers what roughly
may be described as "legislative jurisdiction."
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit--The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLum. L.
Ray. 1, 11 (1945).
57
Draftsman's Memorandum by Gregory D. Buckley, pp. 5-6, on file at the INDIANA
LAw JouRNAL. Cf., AaRAow & EINaoRN, supra note 5, at 153-158.
58The purpose of the statute may have to be the protection of all shareholders of the
target company for the Act to have a valid legislative purpose. The protection of local
industry from relocation as the legislative purpose may cause the Act to be "virtually per
se illegal." ARAxow & EnmOast, supra note 5, at 158. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 145 (1970); text accompanying notes 152-57 infra.
The protection of Indiana industry as a purpose implies a possible use of the Act to
defeat tender offers where the offeror would remove the industry from the state. The main
criticism of most state takeover acts is that they were enacted to protect local inefficient
managements from attacks by corporate raiders. Congress expressly rejected this approach
in a bill presented by Senator Williams only one year before the present version of the
Williams Act was enacted. A state act founded upon such a purpose will have commerce
clause and pre-emption problems. See discussion commencing at note 152 infra.
59
Virginia bases its takeover statute upon the power of the state over Virginia
corporations. Freeman, Business Associations, The Fifteenth Annual Survey of Virginia
Law, 56 VA. L. Rav. 1536, 1537 (1970). The purpose of the Virginia Act is to protect all
shareholders of businesses incorporated under Virginia Law. Gibson & Freeman, Business
Associations, The Thirteenth Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 54 VA. L. REv. 1224, 1242
(1968).
Ohio bases its takeover act upon the premise that a bid is essentially an internal
affairs matter which it may reasonably regulate on a global basis. Shipman, supra note 3,
at 741-48.
Federal legislation in the area (The Williams Act) also has shareholder protection
as its purpose. See Bromberg, supra note 3, at 677; Commerce Clause Limitations, supra
note 5, at 1139 n. 62.
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Act seeks not to protect all shareholders within the staten but only
to protect all shareholders of businesses incorporated under Indiana
law or having substantial contacts with the state.
Sufficiency of the Interest: Due Process
For Indiana to have an interest giving rise to legislative jurisdiction, the state's interest must be sufficient to meet the demands
of the fourteenth amendment due process clause."1 An interest which
will support a state's application of its own law in a conflicts of law
situation is also sufficient to give the state legislative jurisdiction.6
The due process standard for determining the propriety of the application by the forum state of its own law to a given situation is developed in Home Insurance Co. v. Dicks and Clay v. Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd.6 4 In Dick, a citizen of Texas sued a Mexican corporation
in a Texas court on a fire insurance policy for the loss of a tug.' The
policy was made in Mexico by a Mexican company subject to Mexican
law, covering a ship in Mexican waters and issued to a Mexican who
later duly assigned the policy to Dick."6 Dick wished Texas law to
67
apply in order to avoid the Mexican one-year statute of limitations.
In Dick, the Supreme Court held that a state may not apply its law
where the matter litigated had no relation to the state. 8 The Court
said that a state "may not abrogate the rights of parties beyond its
60 To protect all shareholders within the state the Act would have to be territorially
based. See note 52 supra, for an explanation of the disadvantages of a territorially based
takeover act.
61
1n their discussion of the constitutionality of the extraterritorial impact of state
tender offer regulation, ARA~ow & ENHoRN, supra note 5, state:
[Tihe issue must be framed in terms of whether the local benefits which are
derived from regulation of securities transactions that take place outside the state
between nonresident investors justify the burdens imposed on interstate commerce
by this type of regulation.
Id. at 158.
This confuses the issue of legislative jurisdiction with that of whether interstate commerce is unduly burdened. The former issue, specifically whether Indiana may regulate transactions occurring outside of its borders, is properly seen as a due process problem and
is answered by ascertaining whether the state has sufficient interest in the transaction to
justify regulating it. See notes 56-77 supra and text accompanying. As this note argues,
because tender offers involve a potential internal corporate restructuring, Indiana should
have jurisdiction to regulate even tender offers which occur outside its borders, when
made for companies incorporated within Indiana. See notes 78-91 infra and text accompanying.
62 See note 56 supra.
63281 U.S. 397 (1930).
64377 U.S. 179 (1964).
65 281 U.S. at 402.
66

I d. at 403.

67 Id. at 404-05.
68

Id. at 410. See also Reese & Kaufman, sura note 49, at 1129.
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borders having no relations to anything done or to be done within
them."6 9
In Clay v. Sun IMsurance Office, Ltd., the plaintiff, a resident of
Illinois, purchased in Illinois an insurance policy with a 12-month
period of limitation clause from Sun Insurance, an alien corporation
licensed to do business in Illinois, Florida, and several other states. 70
The plaintiff then moved to Florida and became a resident there only
a few months later. The Court held that it would not violate due
process to apply the Florida five-year statute of limitations which nullified clauses with less lengthy periods.7 1 In finding sufficient activity, the
Court noted the "world-wide" nature of the policy, the plaintiff's residency within the state of Florida, and that the insurer was licensed
within that state and thus had an expectancy of being sued there."
A comparison of Dick and Clay shows that where the state has
no interest, application of its law will violate due process, but that if a
state has some interest, then the requirements of the due process clause
have been met.73 Due process does not require that the state's interest
be dominant, or outweigh all other states' interests.74
69 281
70377

U.S. at 410.
U.S. 179, 180 (1964).
71Id. at 181-82.
72 Id. at 182.
73
Brainerd Currie found the Supreme Court's approach in Dick to be an interest
analysis. Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. Cma. L. Rnv. 9, 43, 44 (1958). His general conclusion that the

full faith and credit and due process clauses require only that a state have a legitimate
interest is advanced at 75-76. In Clay, Justice Douglas concluded that Florida had ample
"contacts" for either full faith and credit or due process. 377 U.S. 179, 183 (1964). It is
the author's opinion that Douglas' use of the word "contacts" is indicative of an interest

analysis. The imprecision of the word "contact," used interchangeably with "interest," in
reference to the constitutional standard required to meet due process or full faith and

credit is demonstrated in a student work commenting on Clay, which discussed prior
Supreme Court decisions based on an interest analysis, and then in discussing Clay, shifted
to a "contacts" analysis. See Note, 16 SvnAcusm L.Rav. 128 (1964).
In analyzing the magnitude of interest required, it should be noted that both Dick
and Clay dealt with the limitations, statutory or contractual, to be applied to insurance
contracts, an issue which could be termed "procedural," in comparison to "substantive"
intrusion by Indiana in regulating tender offers beyond its border. To the extent such a
distinction is tenable, tender offer regulation would tend to have a greater disruptive
impact on corporate affairs than would the application of the statute of limitations of
the insured's residence upon the insurance industry. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
475 (1965) (concurring opinion by Harlan, J., relating the distinction between "procedural" and "substantive" to whether the choice of rule would "affect . . . primary decisions respecting human conduct . . .").
74
The RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) op CONPLICr or LAws (1971) generally follows an
interest approach by requiring that the state have a reasonable relationship to the occurrence. See Id. §9. However, the RESTATEMENT provides that as to matters peculiar to corporations, the law of the state of incorporation should apply except in the unusual case
where another state "has a more significant relationship." Id. § 302(2). See also, Id. § 302,
Illustration 2 (the law of state Y, the state of incorporation, should apply where 20% of
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In determining if Indiana has an interest sufficient for purposes
of the due process clause, it is necessary to look to the state's purpose
in enacting the legislation. If protection of industry and employment
within the state is a valid purpose, then Indiana should have a sufficient interest to achieve this purpose where the target company is incorporated, has its principal place of business, or has a substantial
portion of its assets within the state.75 Assuming, however, that the
commerce clause overrides the above purpose, 76 it is then necessary to
determine whether shareholder protection is a sufficient interest to
justify Indiana's regulation of tender offers. It must be noted that
Indiana does not attempt to protect Indiana shareholders by regulating
all tender offers made within the state. Indiana regulates only those
offers where the target is incorporated, has its principal place of business, or a substantial portion of its total assets within the state. Indiana is protecting all shareholders of businesses which are within the
definition of a "target company."'7

7

It is thus necessary to examine

the state's interest in the target company.
Corporations Incorporated in Indiana:
The Internal Affairs Argument
Indiana can be said to be protecting shareholders by regulating
the manner in which an Indiana corporation, or a corporation having
its principal place of business or a substantial portion of its total assets
within the state, may be taken over. Indiana's power to regulate the
course of such takeovers would seem to be consistent with the state's
power to regulate the internal affairs of domestic corporations,78 for
the assets and shareholders are within it, 20% of the assets and shareholders are in state
Z, and 40% of the assets and shareholders in state X where states Y and Z have the same
policy concerning the internal affair.) The R.ESTATE NT contemplates that even where the
organic structure or internal administration of the corporation is involved, a state other
than that of incorporation may apply its law if its interest is clearly superior to the interest
of all other states. Id. § 302, comment g.
It thus appears that the RESTATEmENT requires a greater interest where the matter is
distinct to a corporation than does the due process clause, which appears to require only
an interest. While Indiana's interest in regulating the takeover of foreign target corporations might arguably be valid, it would not appear to be more significant than the
interest of the state of incorporation.
75 Indiana would appear to have a valid interest in regulating tender offers for the
protection of all shareholders of businesses incorporated in Indiana as a matter under the
control of the state's corporate law.
76See text accompanying notes 152-57 inlra.
77 IND. CODE § 23-2-3-1(j) (Burns Supp. 1976). The Act exempts certain target corporations.
See note 37 supra.
78
See notes 49, 59 supra.
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where corporate internal affairs" 9 are involved, to some uncertain extent

there is a constitutional requirement that the law of the state of incorporation be applied."

The commentators argue that the full faith

and credit clause requires that where corporate internal affairs are involved a state, other than the incorporating state, must have a greater
interest to apply its own law.8 '
Before examining the impact of full faith and credit in this area,
the question of whether a tender offer can properly be characterized as
an internal affair of the target corporation must be addressed. One
commentator, while conceding that corporate action is missing, that
the formal structure of the target remains unchanged, and that the
bid involves diverse rather than uniform decisions of shareholders to
tender, nevertheless argues that tender offers are internal affairs transactions.82 That commentator states that under common law the success
of the bid will create a fiduciary relationship between the offeror, the
79

The term "internal affairs" in this discussion refers to considerations weighed in
determining the proper choice of law, rather than whether a foreign court has jurisdiction.
The modem view is that the principles of forum non conveniens govern whether a court
will accept jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. Compare Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947)with Williams v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 326 U.S.
549 (1946). See also Latty, Pseudo-Foreign.Corporations, 65 YAzM L. J. 137, 144 (1955);
Note, Forum Non Conveniens As a Substitute for the Internal Affairs Rule, 58 CoLum. L.
REv. 234 (1958); Note, Jurisdiction of Actions Involving Internal Affairs of Foreign
Corporation,42 IowA L. REv. 90 (1956); Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the "Internal
Affairs" of a Foreign Corporation,33 CoLJM- L. Rnv. 492 (1933). The use of the internal
affairs doctrine as a determinent in choice of law rests upon the belief that uniformity,
corporate efficiency, predictability, ease of application, and equality of shareholders' rights
are advanced by having the laws of the state of incorporation govern such matters. See
Reese
& Kaufman, supra note 49 at 1125-27.
8
0 Shipman, supra note 3, at 742, relying upon the fraternal benefit association case,
Ofder of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947), and upon cases
enforcing shareholder assessments in foreign jurisdictions, e.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294
U.S. 629, 643 (1935), citing Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 260 (1912). But support
for the proposition that the internal affairs rule is constitutionally compelled is weak.
In Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964), the Court limited Wolfe to its
peculiar facts and refused to extend the fraternal benefit line of cases to corporations
in general. Broderick is likewise distinguishable. See Reese, Full Faith and Credit to
Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy, 19 U. CEr. L. REv. 339, 342-43 (1952). Chief
Justice Stone, in analyzing a similar factual situation, found that Georgia had an interest
in determining whether its citizens had assented to the membership obligations imposed
by New York law, Pink v. A.AA. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210-11 (1941).
In view of the Court's interest approach, it is doubtful whether justice Brandeis' mechanical approach in Broderick would be followed today. See Currie, The Constitution and
the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cr. L. REv.
9, 75 (1958); Reese & Kaufman, supra note 49, at 1139 (supporting Shipman's position);
Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of
Law, 44 IowA L. REv. 449, 490-91 (1959).
81
See, Shipman, supra note 3, at 742; Reese & Kaufman, supra note 49, at 1129-32.
Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of
Law, 44 IOWA L. REv. 477.
82
Shipman, supra note 3, at 743-44.
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corporation, and its security holders. 8 Internal affairs are defined as
those matters involving the relations inter se of the corporation, its
shareholders, directors, and officers.8 4 Proxy solicitations and mergers
are considered as within the scope of this definition. 5 A successful
tender offer shifts control and will usually cause a change in either
management or its policies.88 Thus, a takeover bid is functionally
similar to a proxy solicitation,8 7 and where the tendering shareholder
receives securities from the offeror corporation, the result is very
similar to a merger, a classic internal affairs matter."8 This approach
concentrates upon what is the actual purpose and effect of the purchase
of securities pursuant to a tender offer. The commentator thus comes
to the conclusion that the operative effect .of a tender offer affects the
relations inter se of the corporation, its shareholders, directors, and
officers in a way sufficiently analogous to classical internal affairs
matters to justify the state of incorporation's regulation of the offer.
It may be argued that tender offers are not internal affairs transactions because that doctrine can only apply to existing intracorporate
relationships.89 The argument is that since there exists no legal relationship between the target and the offeror, who is only a potential shareholder, there is no existing intracorporate relationship, and as a result
the internal affairs doctrine cannot apply.90 This argument views tender
offers as involving nothing more than a simple purchase and sales of
securities. 9 However, that argument fails to consider the essence of
the transaction which is the shift in corporate control. The argument
is thus too formalistic, does not deal with the intention of the offeror,
and ignores the premium being paid for corporate control.
Foreign and Pseudo Foreign Corporations
The question remains as to what interest Indiana has in protecting stockholders of foreign corporations with their principal place
83Id. at 744.
84 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

Chapter 13, Topic 5, Introductory

Note (1971).
85 See Shipman, supra note 3, at 743-44.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 744, 745. Shipman, citing to H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968),
stated, "Congress, in passing the Williams Bill, found takeover bids functionally similar
to proxy
fights."
8
8 1d. at' 744.
89 Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 5, at 1154.
9
0 ld.
91
The argument has also been made that the determination of who may be a
shareholder should be controlled by blue sky legislation which is based on territorial jurisdiction. See Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 5, at 1154.
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of business or a substantial portion of their assets within the state.
Indiana would not appear to have an interest in regulating the internal
affairs of foreign corporations. 2 The interest in regulating tender
offers would then have to be the protection of Indiana shareholders
by requiring the protection of all shareholders through regulation of
takeover bids for target corporations.9 This interest may be invalid
because it impinges upon the possible interests of other states in regulation,94 and absent a finding that target companies are more likely to
have Indiana shareholders, the interest is too attenuated for the due
process clause.9 5
However, there are several cases which recognize the ability of
foreign states to control the internal affairs of "pseudo-foreign" 6
corporations.9 7 In Western Airlines, Inc. v. Sobieski,9 a leading case
concerning the regulation of "pseudo-foreign" corporations, Western,
incorporated in Delaware, wished to change shareholders' cumulative
voting rights to straight voting. Western's principal place of business
92
A state has a limited degree of power to regulate the conduct of foreign corporations.
It may not exclude foreign corporations engaged solely in interstate commerce. Eli Lilly
& Co. v. Say-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961). A state may exclude a corporation
from intrastate commerce, South Carolina ex rel. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
McMaster 237 U.S. 63, 72 (1915), and thus its entry into the state may be subject to
conditions, including regulation of dividend payments. International Ticket Scale Corp. v.
United States, 165 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1948); German-American Coffee Company v. Diehl,
216 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915) (Cardozo, J.). See also, Baraf, The Foreign Corpo-

ration-A Problem in Choice-Of-Law Doctrine, 33 BROOxLYNr L. Rav. 219, 224-34 (1967);
Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. Rav. 433, 450-52
(1968). It would not appear however that Indiana is seeking to regulate on the basis
of its power to control entry because, while the Act is based upon the state contact with
the 9target,
the state is regulating the offeror.
3
See note 52 supra (stating the ineffectiveness of territorially based tender offers).
94
Where only a "substantial portion of the total assets" are within Indiana, several
states may have an interest in regulating the tender offer. The effect of the Act in this
situation is to force Indiana law upon other interested states. This effect of requiring a
subordination of another state's interest may violate full faith and credit. Cf., Pink v.
A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210-11 (1941).
93T6 determine whether a state has a sufficient interest, compare the factual situation
in Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), supra, text accompanying notes 63-69 and
Clay v. Sun Ins. Co., 377 U.S. 179 (1964), supra, text accompanying notes 70-72. To the
Court in Clay, the application of the forum state's law appeared to be more "equitable" or
"fair" because of the nature of the insurance policy and the insurers being licensed in the
state. Thus, in effect, the due process test for legislative jurisdiction may be a "fairness?'
test as it is for personal jurisdiction. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.

310 (1957).
96A pseudo-foreign corporation is a corporation incorporated outside of the forum
state but having its principal place of business and its major activities centered in the forum
state. See, Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L. J. 137 (1955).
97
Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959); Western Airlines, Inc., v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12
Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961); State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298, 31 N.W.2d 853 (1948),
cert. denied, Bethtel v. Thatcher, 337 U.S. 918 (1949); Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany,
193 Okl. 120, 141 P.2d 571 (1943).
98191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961).
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was California. 9 The California Corporations Commissioner found that
the change in voting rights would constitute a "sale" or "exchange"
under state securities law."° In reversing a lower court's decision adverse to the Commissioner, the appellate court wrote:
[T]o achieve overall fair play and substantial justice, the fiction
of Delaware residence should yield to the totality of California
contacts so as to require, in addition to compliance with the Delaware law, the approval of the California Corporations Commissioner
as a condition to eliminating the right of cumulative voting by the
shareholders. 101
California's power to regulate sales and exchanges of securities is based
upon a territorial, blue sky approach.102 To the extent that such contact
comprises "localization" of the foreign corporation, so that uniform
treatment as between locally incorporated companies and pseudo-foreign
companies becomes desirable, then application of the law of the forum
However,
state is not merely a defensible, but a practical policy.'
insofar as California goes beyond regulation of securities and regulates
the internal affairs of Western, its jurisdiction is based upon Western's
extensive contacts with California. Western Airlines is precedent for
the use of a territorial regulatory system having an extraterritorial
impact in an area which the controlling law has often been considered
to be that of the state of incorporation. 04 The Indiana Act, of course,
is extraterritorial in scope and bases its jurisdiction on either the activity
or the incorporation of the target in the state. While the jurisdictional
basis of the two situations are different, the effect of the Western Airlines case and the Act are similar because they both regulate matters
which are arguably internal affairs of foreign corporations and do so
on the basis of the corporation's activity within the state.
Full Faith and Credit Limitations
The question remains whether it is constitutionally required that
the state have the dominant interest where it is not the state of incorporation and the organic structure or internal administration of the
corporation is affected. The due process clause apparently requires only
99 191 Cal. App. 2d at 400, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 720. California residents held over 30%
of the company's outstanding shares, id. at 402. About 34% of Western's passenger traffic
was completely within the state and 55% either originated or terminated there, and
approximately 757 of its tangible property was in California. Reese & Kaufman, supra
note 49, at 1119.
100 191 Cal. App. 2d at 403, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 721-22.
101 Id.
102 Shipman, supra note 3, at 753. See note 51 supra.
108 Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L. J. 137, 165-66 (1955).
104 See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 49, at 1125-27.
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an interest."° The full faith and credit clause, however, also imposes
limitations upon the state in the application of its own law.
In John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates0 8 the insurance policy was "applied for, issued and delivered, in New York" one
month prior to the policy holder's death."" The widow beneficiary
after the death of her husband moved to Georgia and filed suit."08 In
Yates, the Supreme Court compared the situation to that in Dick and
held that Georgia must give full faith and credit to New York law
when Georgia had no contacts with the controversy to which its law
could apply." 9 It would thus appear that, at least in some circumstances,
the requirements of due process and full faith and credit are coextensive.
If the two clauses are coextensive in regulating tender offers, the due
process tests discussed above should provide sufficient guidance.
However, circumstances exist where the purpose behind the full
faith and credit clause might cause it to be a further limitation than
the due process clause. It has been stated that the purpose of the full
faith and credit clause is "to confer some of the benefits of a unified
nation while at the same time safeguarding the essential interests and
powers of the states.11 0 Thus as one commentator stated:
[T]o determine whether the full faith and credit clause places a
further limitation on a state's choice of law than is imposed by the
due process clause, the interest of the state which gives it the reasonable contact essential under due process is to be weighed against
the need for national uniformity ...ill
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the demand of full faith
and credit is not absolute and does not compel a state to subordinate
its public policy to the statutory law of another state."' Furthermore,
105 See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
377 U.S. 179 (1964).
106 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
0
1 7Id. at 179.

108 The action began in City Court of Carrollton. The defendant appealed to the

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division 2 where the judgment was affirmed. 50 Ga. App.
713, 179 S.E. 239 (1935). The Supreme Court of Georgia on certiorari from Court of
Appeals affirmed. 182 Ga. 213; 185 S.E. 268 (1936). The Supreme Court granted certiorari
299 U.S. 525 (1936).
109 299 U.S. 178, 182.
110 Reese & Kaufman, supra note 49, at 1130. See Weintraub, Due Process and Full
Faith and Credit Limitations on a State's Choice of Law, 44 IowA L. RFv. 449, 477 (1959).

supra,note 110, at 477. See Reese & Kaufman, supra note 49, at 1132.
:"'Weintraub,
1 12

See Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408
(1955); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502
(1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); Gaillard
v. Field, 381 F.2d (10th Cir. 1967) (Oklahoma need not render full faith and credit to
California buyers of gas and oil lease options, so as to void sale under California securities

law, where Oklahoma does not recognize such interests as securities and excludes them
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the Court has never decided whether full faith and credit demands that
the law of the state of incorporation apply to corporate internal affairs
matters. 113 Despite the Court's failure to so hold, at least two commentators feel that the need for national uniformity in dealing with
corporate internal affairs outweighs the states' interests, so that full
faith and credit demands that only the one law should apply." 4 A state,
to apply its own law, should have a more serious interest and closer
connection to the corporation than is necessary for due process." 5
It appears that if the Supreme Court should follow the urging of
some commentators, the full faith and credit clause would require that
for a state other than the state of incorporation to apply its law, it
should have the dominant interest in regulation or at least a very significant relationship to the corporation." 6 The commentators' view of full
faith and credit in the corporate internal affairs situation would limit
the power of states to apply their law to the internal affairs of foreign
corporations within their states. The question raised by the Business
Takeover Act is whether Indiana, if it based its interest for legislative
jurisdiction on the internal affairs doctrine, would also have the power
to regulate the internal affairs of corporations not incorporated in Indiana without violating full faith and credit. It appears that the only
constitutionally commanded restriction is that the state have an interest." 7 Of course, the interest must be valid, which includes validity
under the commerce clause. It is difficult to find an interest in foreign
corporations where the only purpose of the statute and the state's only
interest is shareholder protection.
from its securities act). Contra, Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331
U.S. 586, 607-10, 625 (1947). But see Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 183
(1964) (characterizing Wolfe as "a highly specialized decision dealing with unique
facts. .. ").
"13 A.

EH5NZW=G,

A

TREATIsE ON TE

CoNrxLIcTs OF LAWS, 415 (1962). Ehrenzweig

believes that a state will not violate full faith and credit by refusing to apply the law
of the state of incorporation until the Supreme Court holds that the law of incorporation
must be so applied.
114 Reese & Kaufman, supra note 49, at 1132; R. LEFLAR, AERICAN CoNrrzcrs
LAW, 129-30 (1968). But see, Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy,

21 VAND. L. REV. 433, 447 (1968) (a state with a substantial and valid interest could
apply its own law to a foreign corporation even if full faith and credit is expanded to
apply to the statute of the state of incorporation).
115 Reese & Kaufman, supra note 49, at 1139. The authors state that "[A] state
in which a foreign corporation does only a small fraction of its business probably would
violate full faith and credit if it applied its own law rather than that of the state of incorporation to hold the payment of a dividend [usually an "internal affair"] illegal." Id.
16 See notes 114, 115 supra and text accompanying. Cf. RESTATEMTENT (SECOND)
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302 (1971). See also text accompanying note 75 supra.
117 See notes 73, 112 supra and text accompanying.
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Indiana's sister states will not be compelled to apply the Indiana
Act if they have an interest sufficient to justify applying their own law.
Nevertheless, a state with an interest may choose not to apply its own
law if another choice would better promote the relevant policy considerations."" Where the target is not incorporated within the state, it is
likely that other states will have interests. Thus, it may be that the
Indiana Act will not be applied by its sister states when the target has
its principal place of business or a substantial portion of its assets in
Indiana." 9 To the extent that Indiana law is not applied by its sister
states, the effectiveness of the Act in furthering the state interest will
be decreased.
COMMERCE CLAUSE

Enforcement of the Takeover Act may constitute an impermissible
burden on interstate commerce. The test to determine whether a state
statute places an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce was
set out recently by the Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,20
in which the Court said that:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. 21
This language and other case law suggest that the courts employ a
three-stage analysis under the commerce clause. First it is inquired
whether the ends of the state scheme are legitimate. Second it is
determined whether the means chosen by the state are reasonably well
adapted to effectuate its ends. Finally, the effectiveness of the regulation
22
is balanced against the burden which it places on interstate commerce.
8

1 See RESTATMENT (SECOND)

o CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971); R. LEFLAR, AZERICAe CoNFLiCTS LAw 241-65 (1968). Leflar summarizes the list of considerations to:
(A) Predictability of results; (13) Maintenance of interstate and international order; (C)
Advancement of the judicial task; (D) Advancement of the forum's governmental
interests; and (E) Application of the better rule of law. Indiana in determining whether

to apply its own law should weigh these factors, and decline to enforce the Act where
enforcement
would not promote the above factors.
1 19
Tn RESTATEmENT (SECOND) 0F CONFLICT OF LAWS § 302(2) (1971) would call
for the application of the law of the state of incorporation unless Indiana had a more
significant relationship than principal place of business or location of assets. It is unlikely
that the foreign forum would apply Indiana law unless the target was a "pseudo-foreign"
corporation within Indiana. See id. § 302, comment g.
120397 U.S. 137 (1970).
121397 U.S. at 142.

122South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938)
sets out the first two stages. The court is to inquire "whether the state legislature . . .
has acted within its province, and whether the means of regulation chosen are reasonably
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A court should not look too closely at the reasonableness of the means
chosen, 23 but in the balancing process it may undertake a fairly extensive examination of the burdens on interstate commerce and the local
interest involved, as well as evaluating the effectiveness of the means
chosen. 124 The Court has also indicated that the burdens on interstate
commerce must be more than merely speculative in order to strike down
a state act under the commerce clause.' 25
adapted to the end sought." Id. at 190. Barnwell did not expand on the first stage, involving as it did a subject "peculiarly of local concern." Id. at 187. However, Baldwin v.
G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) and Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278
U.S. 1 (1928) do provide examples of illegitimate state ends, i.e., the securing of an
economic advantage for one state at the expense of sister states. Foster-Fountain Packing
Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. at 10; Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. at 521-22. This
kind of "Balkanization" is said to be what the commerce clause was drafted to prevent.
See Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 400 (1941) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Jackson); F. FRANKFURTER, THE COMraRCE CLAusn 117 (1964) (epilogue by Mendelson).
See also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970).
At the second stage, a danger exists that a court will usurp the legislative function
by second guessing the choice of means, from among those available, that was made by
the legislature. Accordingly, courts are not to require at this stage that the legislature have
chosen the best means available for the effectuation of its ends. See South Carolina State
Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S. at 190-91; Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R., 393 U.S. 129, 238-39 (1968).
Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines,
359 U.S. 520 (1959), and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., suPra, all illustrate the balancing
stage. In Southern Padfic, Chief Justice Stone indicated the Court's willingness to undertake the balancing process, saying:
For a hundred years it has been accepted constitutional doctrine that the
commerce ciause, without the aid of Congressional legislation, . . . affords some
protection from state legislation inimical to the national commerce, and that in
some cases, where Congress has not acted, this Court and not the state legislature
is under the commerce clause the final arbiter between competing demands of
state and national interests.
325 U.S. at 769.
Southern Pacific, Bibb, and Pike also indicate that at this stage, the effectiveness of
the means used in accomplishing the ends of the state becomes relevant. See Southern
Pacific, 325 U.S. at 781-82 and Bibb, 359 U.S. 529-30, both weighing the actual protection
provided to the local interest against the burden on interstate commerce. See also Pike,
397 U.S. at 142, indicating that the availability of more efficient or less burdensome means
will affect the result.
See generally, Note, Use of the Commerce Clause to Invalidate Anti-Phosphate Legislation: Will it Wash?, 45 U. Coio. L. REv. 487 (1974), which suggests that, because of
the possibilities inherent in the balancing stage for usurpation of a legislative function, the
courts should either indulge a presumption of the legitimacy of the state act at this stage
in the analysis, or abandon balancing altogether. Id. at 492. Cf. Mr. Justice Black's dissent
in Southern Pacific, 325 U.S. at 784. Balancing may be less appropriate in cases where
the legislation burdens local as well as foreign business, because at least some of the
businesses being burdened will have political influence in the state's legislature. See Dunham, Congress, the States and Commerce, 8 J. PuB. L. 47, 58 (1959). That ought not to
affect the analysis in this case; because Indiana is not a state with a heavy concentration
of corporate wealth, the Takeover Act will probably have its primary impact on the citizens
of other states.
123 See note 122 supra.
124
25

Id.

"[S]tate laws will not be invalidated without the support of relevant factual
material which will 'afford a sure basis' for an informed judgmenL" Southern Pacific Co.
1
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The Indiana Act is subject to challenge at all three stages of review.
The Act contains no purpose clause, 1 26 and there is very little in the
way of legislative history. 27 Its purpose, therefore, must be gleaned
from an analysis of the provisions of the Act, and what they seem intended to accomplish. 2 8 Under the most favorable interpretation of the
Indiana Act, it has as its purpose the protection of stockholders of the
target corporation during tender offers.
Through its disclosure 9 and waiting period8 0 provisions, the Takeover Act will provide offerees with information which the legislature
has determined to be relevant to a decision whether or not to tender,
and will also give shareholders the time needed to reach a decision.
Information about the offeror is part of the disclosure that must be
made.' 8' And the offeror must disclose whatever plans it has for the
target company should the tender offer succeed.'" 2 These plans may
affect the value of shareholders' retained stock,' 8 and the outlook for
future dividends, information which is central to a decision whether
to tender. And these plans will be of particular interest to local shareholders, who may be concerned about any relocation schemes which the
offeror has in mind.
The Act also provides that the shareholder have adequate time to
decide whether to tender. Before the advent of tender offer regulation,
the typical offer was a fast moving, high pressure affair. 1 If more
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945), quoting Terminal Railroad Ass'n v. Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1, 8 (1943).
126 See I n. CODE § 23-2-3-1 et seq. (Burns Supp. 1976).
127 Certain drafts of the Act as submitted to and changed by the legislature, proposed amendments, and a draftsman's memorandum are on file with the INDIAI;A LAw
JouRwAL. There were no published hearings, committee reports, or floor debates.
128A purpose clause would only serve initially to focus attention even if it were
present; it would not effectively shield an examination of the operative provisions of the
Act. "One challenging the validity of a state enactment on the ground that it is repugnant
to the commerce clause is not necessarily bound by the legislative declarations of purpose.
It is open to him to show that in their practical operation its provisions directly burden or
destroy interstate commerce." Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10
(1928). See also E.T. CRAWroRD, STATUTORY CoNsTRucTioN 356 (1940). Cf. Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 288-89 (1936); F.R. DIcEEasoN, LEGIsrAmv DRAFTING,

107-08
(1954).
129

IND. CODE-§ 23-2-3-2(c)

(Burns Supp. 1976).
IND. CODE §23-2-3-2(b),(c) (Burns Supp. 1976).
See note 16 supra.
1 82
1=s. CODE §23-2-3-2(c)(3) (Burns Supp. 1976).
13aIn a successful tender offer, if more than the required number of shares are
tendered, the pro rata takeup provisions of the Indiana Act, IND. CODE § 23-2-3-5(b)
(Bums Supp. 1976) and the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (6) (1971) may result in
making a significant number of shareholders into minority shareholders, who would be
faced with the choice of either selling their stock at its appraised value or submitting to
the control of the successful offeror.
1 84
If you are a shareholder, you may suddenly be forced to decide whether or not
to dispose of a portion of your investment portfolio. Whether to accept or reject
1 80
1 81
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shares were tendered than the offeror wished to purchase, the shares
would be taken on a first-come, first-served basis.'35 This meant that
a shareholder who took the time to analyze the situation stood the risk
of being passed over when shares were taken up. The waiting period
prior to effectiveness of the offer and the withdrawal period will allow
shareholders time to decide. And the provision for full pro rata takeup
will relieve the pressure which has been generated in the past by firstcome, first-served tender offers.
Shareholders will also wish to gauge the prospects for the success
of the tender offer. Those shareholders favoring the offeror will wish
to know the chances for success before deciding how actively they
should aid the offer by tendering stock. Shareholders opposed to the
offer will, depending on the likelihood of success, either hold their stock
and thereby help to defeat the offer, or sell on the open market to avoid
becoming minority shareholders. 3 ' And those shareholders who are
interested in realizing a capital gain either by tendering their shares or
by selling them on the open market as the price rises . . will also want
to know the chances for success of the offer. The provision of the Takeover Act which requires disclosure of the offeror's present holdings oi
the target's stock 13 will aid shareholders somewhat in making these
determinations,'3 9 since a tender offer made by an offeror who has
previously gained a substantial position in the target company is more
likely to be successful. 4 ' The Act's advance disclosure and waiting
period provisions may also provide greater information to the offerees,
since the market will have greater time to react to the offer. Arbitraa tender is a decision vital to you as an investor; yet often it must be made hurriedly, under pressure, and without the bidder's full disclosure of all material facts.
Hayes & Taussig, supra note 5, at 135. These authors found that 30% of the tender
offers that they studied lasted between 11 and 15 days. Id. at 141. See also Branson, supra
note 5, at 740; Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUrTGERs L. Rlv.
609, 638-39 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Brudney].
135 See Brudney, supra note 134, at 639.
136 See note 133 supra.
137 Henry, supra note 5, describes how people buy stock at its market price so that
they can realize a profit by tendering the same stock at the premium tender offer price.
Their activities will raise the price of the stock, if they are buying.
138 IND. CODE § 23-2-3-2(c) (4) (Bums Supp. 1976).
139 Branson, supra note 5, at 745.
140 Hayes & Taussig, note 5 supra, at 139. However, the 1970 amendments to the
Williams Act may have the effect of minimizing any differences based on the offeror's preoffer position in the target. Section 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) was amended to require
the filing of a schedule 13D when a person becomes the owner of 5% or more of a class
of securities of a corporation. So, most offerors will acquire just under 5% before making
the offer. If an offer was for 51% of 100,000 shares, whether an offeror owned 2% (2,000)
or 4.9% (4,900) of the target's shares would seem to make little difference. He would
still have to acquire either 46,100 or 49,000 shares in order to be successful, and the extra
2,900 shares would be of little predictive value.
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geurs will have had an opportunity to acquire large blocks of shares,
and their activities will tend to indicate the offer's chances of success
141
as viewed by highly sophisticated investors.
Some benefits should also flow from the Commissioner's review
of the fairness-of the offer." In both cash and exchange offers, the
Commissioner may review the ability of the offeror to pay for whatever
shares are eventually taken up and may estimate what the offeror's
financial condition will be after payment has been made. 43 This will
be of value to the potential minority shareholders in a cash offer, and
to all shareholders in an exchange offer.'
Critics of the Act, and similar legislation has attracted its share,145
will characterize the purpose of the Act not as shareholder protection,
but as the preservation of local industry, jobs and tax revenues by
insulating incumbent management from attack by tender offer. 146 The
14 1 See Henry, supra note 5, at 470. It could be, however, that the average investor
would not know how to interpret the price movements discussed in this article, and so
will be unable to use the information. Cf. Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 5, at
1151, suggesting that advance disclosure will cause market disruptions which could result
in suspension of trading in the target's stock. The author relies on a New York Stock
Exchange review of the Ohio Act, Orno CODE ANN. § 1707.041 et seq. (1975 Supp.),
when it was before the Ohio legislature. The review alleged that the bil's twenty-day
advance disclosure section would create difficult conditions in the market which could
result in a temporary suspension of trading. 1 BNA SEc. REG. & L. RPr. A-12 (1969).
The N.Y.S.E. asked for an exemption for N.Y.S.E.-listed corporations from the provisions
of the4 2 Ohio act. Id. at A-3l.
1 IND. CODE §23-2-3-2(e),(f) (Burns Supp. 1976).
43
1 In an exchange offer by General Host for Armour Co., the Wisconsin Commissioner
of Securities denied registration of the securities proposed to be exchanged by General
Host. The Commissioner found:
6. If the General Host exchange offer is successful, the amount of its 7%
Subordinated Debentures and Warrants which would then be outstanding would
be unreasonably large in proportion to the other classes of its securities, giving
due consideration to all relevant factors.
7. The historical consolidated cash flow of General Host, computed giving
due consideration to all relevant factors and adjusted for the issuance of its
7% Subordinated Debentures and the other securities mentioned above, does not
appear sufficient to cover the interest requirements on the 77 Subordinated
Debentures proposed to be offered to the Armour common stockholders.
8. By reason of the findings in paragraphs 6 and 7 above, it does not appear
that the proposed General Host exchange offer is fair or equitable to or in the
interests of the Armour common stockholders or debenture holders.
Release of Wisconsin Office of Commissioner of Securities, Feb. 10, 1969, [1954-71 Transfer
Binder] CCH BLUE Sxy L. Rs'm 70,805 (1969).
144The Commissioner should not, however, review the adequacy of the consideration
involved, because that should be a judgment to be made by the individual offerees. See
notes 237-39 infra and text accompanying.
145See, e.g., Arftxow & EnORN, supra note 5; Brudney, supra note 134; Hayes &
Taussig, supra note 5; Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman
Cohen, 1967 Dunn L.T. 231; Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 5.
146 "Thinly disguished as legislation for the protection of investors, these statutes
cannot in any practical sense be viewed as anything more than attempts to protect incumbent management and local industry." ARNow & EnrORN at 172. See also id. at 153.
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provision exempting negotiated offers from the operation of the Act 47
evidences such a purpose. Shareholders of companies which negotiate
tender offers will be left without the protection of the Act. The implication is that the Indiana legislature was not at all interested in protecting
shareholders, but merely in setting up a procedural labyrinth to be negotiated by a hostile tender offeror 48 A more favorable inference is that
the legislature believed that investors would be adequately protected in
negotiated tender offers by the fiduciary responsibilities of management
and other restrictions on their actions. 49 Such a facially valid legislative
judgment should not be open to court challenge."50 The courts should
not require that states adopt the most perfect means available to accomplish the statutory purpose.151
If it were found that the purpose of the Act was to insulate management of local industry from attack by tender offer, the Act may then
be held to violate the commerce clause. In Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 52 the Supreme Court said:
[T]he court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes
requiring business operations to be performed in the home State that
could more efficiently be performed elsewhere. Even where the State
is pursuing a dearly legitimate local interest, this particular burden
on commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal.' 5 s
The issue here is whether erecting a barrier against attacks on
local management has the unconstitutional effect of "requiring business
operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently
be performed elsewhere." Certainly in Pikes this was the effect of the
"The ultimate adverse effect of these statutes may be to prohibit tender offers ...
Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 5, at 1133.
147 IND. CODE §23-2-3-1(i)(5)
(Burns Supp. 1976). This provision was not in the
original bill as introduced in the Indiana Senate, but was added while the bill was in
committee. See Senate Bill 188, introduced 1-7-75, and same, as reported out of committee
on 2-27-75, on file with the INDIANA LAw JouRNAL.
148 Timing is said to be crucial to the success of a tender offer, and the Act severely
disrupts an offer's timing. Timing is important because an offeror who can surprise target
management has a few days in which to obtain tenders before management can react
with any defensive strategies. With advance notice and extended withdrawal, target management will have time to plan ways to defeat the offer. See the discussion of defensive
tactics at notes 162-170 inlra and text accompanying. If enough time is given to target
management, it may be able to block the offer before any shares have been tendered.
See ARANow & EiNHoRN supra note 5, at 19; Hayes & Taussig, supra note 5, at 139;
Branson, supra note 5 at 725-26; Bromberg, supra note 3, at 651; Commerce Clause
Limitations, supra note 5, at 1134-36.

Shipman, supra note 3, at 729.
See note 123 supra and text accompanying.
151 See notes 122-24 supra and text accompanying.

149 See
150

152397 U.S. 137 (1970).
153397 U.S. at 145.
154 See id. at 140, 145. See also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). In that case
a South Carolina statute required that shrimp boats fishing in the state's territorial waters
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state acts under challenge. The state had decreed that certain operations
must be done within its borders.15 5 The Indiana regulations may discourage the making of some tender offers and impede the success of
still others. Indeed, some offerors might plan to move assets or operations outside the state, while others will purchase, maintain, and
profit from continued operation of going concerns within the state. The
effect of requiring that business operations stay in the state is both too
remote and too speculative, especially when compared with Pike and
similar cases, 156 to justify the conclusion that the Act puts an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. 57
Tender offers have been defended as a means by which an entrenched but inefficient management can be replaced or prodded into
effective leadership. 158 However this theory should not rise to a constitutional argument. 5 The commerce clause mandates that trade among
unload their catch in South Carolina. Id. at 391. This was held to impose an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 406.
155 397 U.S. at 138.

156 See, e.g., Dean AMlk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); H.P. Hood &
Sons, Inc., v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
157
See note 122 supra.
i58 S.REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., Ist Seas. 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. 550].
The conclusion that target corporations are characterized by inefficient management is
certainly open to challenge. "[1It is a misconception to picture tender offers made solely
in the context of bad management. Tender offers are also made in situations characterized by
efficient management. ..." Note, Economic Realities of Cash Tender Offers, 20 M. L. RZv.
237, 254 (1968), which surveyed the 18 tender offers made for New York Stock Exchange
companies during the first six months of 1967. ANow & EnEoR, supra note 5, at 2,
conclude that a relatively low price-earnings ratio is the most important factor is assessing
a corporation's vulnerability to a tender offer. Other factors are declining earnings, excess
liquidity, and concentrated share ownership. Id. at 4-6. However Hayes & Taussig, supra
note 5, whose survey covered all tender offers for a ten year period, conclude that poor
performance, declining dividends, and excess liquidity are the significant characteristics. Id.
at 142. Compare the situation of B.F. Goodrich at the time Northwest Industries attempted
a takeover of Goodrich. O'Hanlon, Goodrich's Four-Ply Defense, FORTuNE, July, 1969 at
110, gives a picturesque account.
159 The assertion that tender offers promote efficient management because they primarily
attack companies with inefficient management does not provide a ground for holding the
Act unconstitutional under the commerce clause. It requires the postulate that the commerce clause prohibits the states from protecting inefficient management, and also presupposes a finding that tender offers are made for corporations with inefficient management.
Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), was concerned with the state requiring
that packing operations be performed within Arizona rather than California, which is not
the same thing as protecting corporate managers from being replaced. Compare Dean Milk
Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) with H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond,
336 U.S. 525 (1949). All of these cases involved a much more certain burden on the
nation's commerce than may arise from insulating inefficient corporate managers. Furthermore, tender offers may be made for a number of reasons, as the draftsmen of the
Williams Act were aware. "It was also recognized that these bids are made for many
other reasons, and do not always reflect a desire to improve the management of the
company." S. RE. 550, supra note 158, at 3. And, a company may have quite efficient
management, yet be undervalued. It would be an appealing target for just that reason.
See Note, Economic Realities of Cash Tender Offers, 20 Mft. L. REv. 237, 254 (1968), con-
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the states be unrestricted by local regulations serving relatively insignificant purposes ;.6O however this does not mean that all businesses must
161
be managed efficiently.
There is a related and more substantial objection to the Indiana
Act. The Act's provisions make tender offers more difficult and may
therefore discourage the making of them. By restricting or eliminating
this form of trading in the securities of subject corporations, the Act
would impede interstate commerce. And if shareholder protection is the
goal, the Act may in some ways be counterproductive, since it may
destroy a potential market for the very shareholders it purports to

protect.
It has been said that surprise is a major advantage in a successful
tender offer.'62 The more quickly the tender offer opens and closes, the
less time is available for target management to employ any of the many
defenses that are available to it. 6 ' These defenses may include, among
other things, communications with shareholders; persuading a third
party, friendly to management, to make a competing tender offer; raising the possibility of or consummating a merger with a third party;
acquiring a third party which will create antitrust problems for the
offeror if the offer is successful; and engaging in dilatory litigation.""
In general, the odds are on the side of target management already, and
giving the target extra time to react, by use of a waiting period, or an
extended withdrawal period, will make it virtually impossible to make
cluding that bidders may be seeking to realize a profit by purchasing undervalued companies.
160 See note 3 supra and text accompanying.
161 See note 159 supra.
1 62
ARANOW & ErtoRN, supra note 5, at 161.
163Schmults & Kelly, supra note 5; Yoran, Advance Defensive Tactics Against Takeover Bids, 21 Am. J. Comp. L. 531 (1973) and Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by
Incumbent Managements in Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. Rav. 1104 (1969) analyze
the available tactics. A new one has recently appeared on the scene. In an attempt to
discourage a tender offer by General Cable Corp., Microdot Inc. said that it would request
shareholder authorization to liquidate. Wall St. Journal, Jan. 16, 1976, at 22, col. 1.
(midwest ed.).
164 Target management may also seek to enjoin the tender offer because of violations
of the Indiana Act or the Williams Act. Indeed, as evidenced by the hearing provisions,
IND. CODE § 23-2-3-2(f) (Burns Supp. 1976), the Act appears structured so that target
management will enforce it. Some case law under the Williams Act has developed rather
strict standards for injunctive relief, e.g. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49
(1975); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir.
1969); but see note 212 infra. These should be followed under the Indiana Act, with
investor protection as the touchstone. Target management should not be able to block
legitimate tender offers and thus deprive stockholders of this market for their shares
by raising frivolous claims for injunctive relief. See Note, Judicial Control of Cash Tender
Offers-A Few Practical Recommendations, 50 IND. L.J. 114, 129-30 (1974); cf. discussion
of the hearing process at notes 230-36 infra and text accompanying.
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a successful offer.1 65 Two commentators make the explicit point that
the offeror must very carefully time the offer and maintain tight secrecy
before the time to announce the offer.' 6
Beyond providing management with more time to defend against
the offer, the Indiana Act enables the target to engage in delaying
7
tactics through the complex and detailed disclosure which is required.11
The target management will inevitably find fault with the offeror's
attempts to comply with the Act, 6 " and on that basis seek an injunction
against the tender offer, or persuade the Commissioner to engage in a
detailed hearing before declaring the offer to be effective.'6 9 The chances
for success of the offer are further decreased by reducing the amount
of pressure that can be put on shareholders to tender. As has already
been explained,' 70 this is the effect of full pro rata takeup, an extended
withdrawal period, and the waiting period. Moreover, the legal uncertainties which will be generated by the Act will tend to discourage
offerors.
To summarize, there is at least strong theoretical argument that
the Indiana Act will severely discourage the making of a tender offer
for a subject corporation. If this argument is correct, the Act will
burden interstate commerce in the stock of subject corporations. However, it may be difficult to establish the existence of this burden to the
satisfaction of constitutional standards.'' There are few empirical data
to support the theory that a statute of this sort will discourage and
impede tender offers. Yet the commentators seem to be in agreement
that this will be the effect,' - and the Act was drafted after much of this
commentary had been digested by the securities bar.Y7
Assuming that the Act does impose a burden on interstate commerce, that is not the end of the analysis. The burdensome provisions
165See Hayes & Taussig, supra note 5, at 139; Commerce Clause Limitations, supra
note 5, at 1136.
166Hayes & Taussig, supra note 5, at 139.
6 7

1
'

68

See note 16 supra.
See Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.

L. REv.
991 (1973).
16 9

See note 18 supra.
17 0 See notes 134-35 supra and text accompanying.
1 71
See note 125 supra and text accompanying. For a discussion of the problems of
proof of such legislative facts, and a suggestion that expert testimony at trial be relied
on to help answer questions like how much a regulation will burden interstate commerce,
see Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SuPREmE COuRT RBviEw 75,

99-109.

17 See, e.g., ARANoW & EsmuoRN, supra note 5, at 265; Hayes & Taussig, supra note
5, at 145; Sommer, supra note 3, at 682; Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 5,
at 1136.
17 3 'fe Act was drafted in the spring of 1975. Most of the commentary listed in note
5 bad been published by then.
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of the Act are the very provisions that will benefit shareholders of subject corporations.' 4 The Indiana legislature may well have thought that
this burden was worth the benefi' 5 of providing shareholders with the
opportunity to make rational and deliberate decisions regarding the
future of their investment. 76 Moreover, some of the defensive tactics that
target management may now have time to employ will also benefit
shareholders' 7 7 A tender offer may prod management into declaring a
dividend. Defensive mergers and competing offers, which management
may try to arrange, will provide shareholders with additional options in
disposing of their stock. The objectionable features of the Act are
therefore incidents of what may operate as a scheme of investor protection.
As in so many areas of the law, balancing is necessary. As the Act
stands now, the scale appears to tip toward an impermissible burden.
If indeed a chilling effect on interstate commerce is present, the shareholder benefits to be gained from the legislation will be severely reduced.
[f a tender offer is never made, there is no need for management to
present shareholders with alternatives in the form of merger proposals
or competing tender offers. There is also no spur to declare greater dividends. If a tender offer will never be made, shareholders will not have
the opportunity to use the time provided to pass on its virtues and
deficiencies. With shareholder benefits thus rendered meaningless, any
burden on commerce would be unreasonable, and under prevailing commerce clause doctrine, unconstitutional.
174 Indeed, to the extent that a tender offer's success depends on the pressures that
offerors can place on stockholders, especially in a depressed market, tender offers are inhibited precisely because the shareholder is relieved of that pressure by the state. See
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 597 (5th Cir. 1974).
175 See note 122 supra and text accompanying.
176 The District Court's responsibility for making "findings of fact" certainly does
not authorize it to resolve conflicts in the evidence against the legislature's conclusion or even to reject the legislative judgment on the basis that without convincing
statistics in the record to support it, the legislative viewpoint constitutes nothing
more than what the District Court in this case said was "pure speculaion."
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R., 393 U.S. 129,
138-39 (1968).
117 Schmults & Kelly, supra note 5; Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent
Managements in Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STAx. L. Rav. 1104, 1127-28 (1969). Those
which do not serve the interests of shareholders should be prohibited during the course of
the offer. The Commissioner should have the power to do this under the antifraud and
antimanipulation sections of the Act. The British have adopted this approach, prohibiting
any action by the target which would tend to frustrate a bona fide tender offer. Branson,
supra note 5, at 732. For discussion of the fiduciary obligations which target management
owes to the shareholders during a tender offer, see Krasik, Tender Offers: The Target
Company's Duty of Disclosure, 25 Bus. LAw. 455 (1969) and Yoran, Advance Defensive
Tactics Against Takeover Bids, 21 Am. J. oF Cozy. L. 531 (1973).
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This is not to say that the Act should be abandoned. It may be
possible to amend or administer it in such a way that it will not unduly
discourage bona fide tender offers. The primary objection to-the Act
is the added opportunity which it provides to target management to
defend against the tender offer. Since this results primarily from the
advance notice and waiting period provided by the Act, a shortening of
the waiting period would reduce this opportunity. Advance notice might
still be of value to shareholders, because it would provide a period
during which they can analyze the situation and would not be able to
tender. A period of five to seven days may be appropriate. This could
allow target management itself to communicate with shareholders, but
may not be long enough for it to employ some of the more complex
defensive strategies which require dealings with third parties. Another
method could be to limit the defensive tactics that could be used by
management to those in which the benefits to shareholders outweigh the
impeding effect on the tender offer. This would be consistent with a
scheme of investor protection, and would bolster the case for the Act's
validity. An example of a defensive tactic that would not pass this test
would be the modification of existing contracts with suppliers, customers, or creditors, so that in the event of a successful tender offer,
contracts would be cancelled and loans accelerated.'7 Another example
might be for management to issue new stock and place it in friendly
hands in order to dilute the offeror's strength. 9 Application of this
principle to other defensive tactics by target management would be an
extension of existing law, but it would not be without precedent. 8 0 In
17SNote, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements in Contesting

Tender Offers, 21 SrA. L. Ray. 1104, 1109 (1969), speaking of contractual obstacles,
concludes that blatant attempts by management to secure its incumbency are a violation
of its
fiduciary duty to shareholders.
179
This can be done by issuing new stock and placing it in friendly hands, by exercising options if friendly people hold substantial options, and by converting other convertible securities to the class for which the tender offer is made. Delaware has disapproved
of tactics like these when they are obviously engaged in for the purpose of defeating a
tender offer. In Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769 (Del. CL of Chancery,
1967), after plaintiff had purchased slightly over 509 of defendant's shares pursuant to a
tender offer, defendant issued 75,000 previously authorized shares and executed an agreement to place them in friendly hands. The court concluded that, despite defendant's justifications for the action, its primary purpose in issuing the stock was to prevent control from
passing to plaintiff. The court characterized this as depriving plaintiff of its right to assert
voting control "by what is virtually a corporate legerdemain," and ordered the 75,000
shares cancelled. 230 A.2d at 777.
180See discussion of Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ct. of
Chancery, 1967) in note 179 supra. Tender offer statutes recently enacted in Idaho, South
Dakota and Utah all require that the target company make a shareholder list available to
the offeror. InAHo CoDE §30-1505(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976); S.D. Co:iarED LAws ANN.
§47-32-12(3) (Cum. Supp. 1976); 1976 UTAH LAws, S. 10, §7(6), reported at [1976]
BrLu Sim L. REP. (CCH) %47,333.
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Britain, where the tender offer was employed before it took hold in this
country, management is prohibited from engaging in any tactics during
the course of the offer which would frustrate a bona fide tender offer."'
It is, of course, desirable that a tender offer be decided on its merits
rather than on the relative abilities of the antagonists to manipulate the
shareholders. It may be possible for the Commissioner to adopt some
rules along those lines, pursuant to the rulemaking power which the
Act vests in the Commissioner. However, this would be a very drastic
change in the present structure of the Act. With the exception of proscribing tactics that border on more traditional notions of fraud or
manipulation, it is doubtful that the Commissioner could engage in such
amendment by executive fiat. If this cannot be done, the Act should
be amended to allow rules controlling defensive tactics, and neutralizing
much of the advantage that the Act now provides target management
through its advance disclosure, waiting period, and extended withdrawal period provisions. Rules of the sort proposed would restore
the balance between target management and tender offeror to the benefit
of the shareholders, and would meet some of the constitutional objections
to which the Act is subject.
PREEMPTION

The Indiana Act's regulation of tenders for local companies may
be preempted by the force of the Williams Act, which regulates tender
offers on the federal level. The supremacy clause invalidates any state
law or state action which interferes with or obstructs the exercise of
federal power, 182 thereby permitting the federal government to effectuate
national policy pursuant to the Constitution.. 8 The traditional test of
preemption, in the absence of specific congressional provision, was established in Hines v. Davidowitzl 4 and Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp.,185
and reaffirmed by the Court in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal Inc.'8 6 The test, very simply stated, is whether Congress intended to preempt state law in passing the legislation. That intent may
be evidenced by a congressional scheme of regulation so pervasive that
it is reasonable to infer that Congress left no room for the states to
supplement it; or by a federal interest in the field so dominant that the
181 Branson, supra note 5, at 716, 732.
18 2 See Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 120 (1965) ; Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank,
161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896).
183See Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 239-40 (1967); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 1, 210-11 (1824).
184312 U.S. 52 (1941).
185331 U.S. 218 (1947).
186411 U.S. 624 (1973).
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states- are precluded from enforcing laws on the same subject; or by a
conflict between the goals sought to be achieved by Congress and the
1
effects of the state statute or regulation.

7

1

Preemption of state law by a federal statute is a serious legislative
decision not lightly to be presumed. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fener
and Smith, Inc. v. Ware,' the question was the possible preemption of
a state act by a rule adopted, pursuant to the 19341 Act, by the New York
Stock Exchange. The Court held that preemption analysis was to be
tempered by an attempt, whenever possible, to reconcile the two statutes.' There should be no preemption absent persuasive reasons for
it,'9 0 and a conflicting law should be preempted only to the extent necessary to protect the aims of the federal legislation.' 9 '
The Williams Act is a part of the 1934 Act,' which contains
an explicit non-preemption provision, section 28 (a), reading in part:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities
commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of
any State over any security or any person insofar as it does not
conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder. 93
itself may dispose of the first two possible grounds for
This section ifi
preemption under the Williams Act-a pervasive federal scheme and a
dominant federal interest.9 In this section Congress made clear that
the scheme of regulation enacted was not so pervasive that the states
could not also act in the area. Congress also recognized that the federal
interest in securities regulation was not so dominant that the states
were to be excluded.' 95
'87Id, at 633. It should always be possible to comply with both the Indiana Act
and the Williams Act, since both Acts merely prescribe minimums, and compliance with
the stricter of the two will automatically mean compliance with the other. See, discussion
of timing, note 17 supra and text accompanying; withdrawal rights, note 20 supra and
text accompanying; disclosure, note 16 supra and text accompanying; and pro rata takeup,
note 21 supra and text accompanying.
188414 U.S. 117 (1973).
189414 U.S. at 127.

10Id. at 139.
191Id. at 127.
192See note 5 supra (The 1934 Act); note 42 supra (The Williams Act).
193 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1970).
194 See Note, SEC Rulemaking Authority and the Protection of Investors: A Comment
on the Proposed "Going Private" Rules, 51 IND. L.J. 433, 441 n. 44 (1976). However, it
has been said that this type of saving clause is often given minimal effect by the Supreme
Court. Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12
STAN. L. RFv. 208, 213-14 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Preemptionas a PreferentialGround].
195 Some have argued that § 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act in practice provides
for preemption under the qualifying clause, "insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." See Commerce Clause
Limitations, supra note 5, at 1133. However, in this context, Congress may well have in-

1088

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:1051

Even if section 28(a) is disregarded, a pervasive scheme of national regulation and a dominant federal interest, the first two grounds
of preemption, are probably not present in the case of tender offer
9 6 and Pennsylvania v. Nelson 19 7 offer examples
regulation. Burbank"
of the kind of pervasive federal scheme that preempts state action of
any sort, since local regulation could only interfere with the efficient
administration of the federal program involved. In Burbank, there was
potential interference with the FAA's delicate task of coordinating air
traffic schedules. 198 And in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, the Court concluded
that state action in the field of sedition control interfered with the
work of the FBI and the CIA. 9 ' In fact, the FBI had requested that
the states stay out of the area.20 ' The SEC has taken no comparable
action in the tender offer area. 20 1 Burbank and Pennsylvania v. Nelson
suggest that preemption demands a federal scheme in which any state
action would present the threat of interference with its workings."
tended a narrow interpretation of the word "conflict", such as impossibility of performance
of both statutes. Cf. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 45 (1966);
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). Compliance with the conflicting
schemes of regulation in Bibb would have required remodeling of trucks while they were
on an interstate run.
Congress must have been cognizant of the states' role in securities regulation, including
refusal by some states to approve transactions permitted under federal law. See, e.g.,
Release of Wisconsin Office of Commissioner of Securities, Feb. 10, 1969, [1954-71 Transfer
Binder] CCH BLUE SxY LAw R'mR. 70,805 (1969), which denied registration to warrants
and debentures proposed to be issued in an exchange offer. Congress may have meant for
the states to continue to play that role, at least if state law could be observed without a
violation of federal law.
An earlier draft of what was to become § 28(a) contained a much broader preemption
section than did the final bill. S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 26(a) (1934) provided:
The rights and remedies provided by this Act shall be in addition to any and
all other rights and remedies that may exist at law or in equity, except that this
Act shall supersede such laws of any State as are inconsistent with the provisions
or purposes of this Act and such laws of any State as provide for the supervision
or regulation of the administration or conduct of business on any exchange which
is licensed by the Commission.
6 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAEAR, LEGIsrATivE HIsToRY OF THE SECURITIES ACT or 1933 AND
SEcuRiTiEs EXCHANGE ACT or 1934, 6435 (1973).
196411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973).
1-7350 U.S. 497 (1956).
198411 U.S. at 627, 633-34, 639.
199 350 U.S. at 504.
200 Id. at 506.
201 But see note 217 infra, and the New York Stock Exchange statement on the Ohio
Act at 1 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. A-11 to A-12 (1969), suggesting the need for an exemption for N.Y.S.E.-isted corporations. For a discussion of the role of administrative agency
attitudes in preemption cases, see Note, Federal Pre-emption of State Laws: The Effect of
Regulatory Agency Attitudes on Judicial Decisionmaking, 50 IND. L.J. 848 (1975).
202 Although the Williams Act may be said to be complex, the test of a pervasive federal scheme should require more than mere complexity in the regulatory system. See New
York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
We reject, to begin with, the contention that pre-emption is to be inferred merely
from the comprehensive character of the federal work incentive provisions ....
The
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Enforcement of the Indiana Act, however, need not conflict with the
20 3
SEC's administration of the Williams Act.
Nor is the federal interest in securities regulation so dominant
that the states may not act. Historically, the states were the first to ad
in this field, stepping in to fill a need long before Congress had acted. 2 "
Given the traditional role of the states in this area, the federal interest
in the field cannot be termed so dominant that the area is one of exclusive federal concern. Nor is the need for uniformity of regulation
great enough to require preemption. Uniformity would provide convenience to some of the participants in a tender offer.20 5 But convenience
alone is not a decisive ground for preemption, and a dominant national
interest in uniformity, in the abstract, seems to have declined in importance as a ground for preemption. 0 8
Although there is no dominant federal interest or pervasive federal
regulatory scheme which preempts the field, it must also be asked
whether the Indiana Act frustrates or conflicts with the federal legislation. A state act which prevents the full accomplishment of the purposes
of a valid congressional enactment may be preempted. 0 7 Perez v.
Campbell"' suggests the obvious, that the state and federal statutes must
first be construed, to determine their purposes and effects, and then
compared, to discover conflict or frustration of purpose.20 9 Since the
Williams Act is remedial legislation, it is to be construed broadly to
subjects of modem social and regulatory legislation often by their very nature
require intricate and complex responses from the Congress, but without Congress
necessarily intending its enactment as the exclusive means of meeting the problem.
Id. at 415 (citations omitted).
208See note 187 supra.
204

The first Blue Sky law was passed by Kansas in 1911, Kan. L. 1911, c. 133, 22
years before Congress acted. See L. Loss & E. CowETT, BLUE Sxn LAw 7 (1958).
205 An offeror who would have to file only one disclosure statement would certainly
benefit. Target management would also benefit from uniformity because it would know
what20actions it could take across the country.
1In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973), the
Court stressed the effect of the state act on the policy goals of the federal act, at the same
time recognizing that Congress has shared securities regulation with the states. The Court
said:
Convenience in exchange management may be desirable, but it does not support
a plea for uniform application when the rule to be applied is not necessary for
the achievement of the national policy objectives reflected in the Act. Indeed,
Congress, in the securities field, has not adopted a regulation system wholly apart
from and exclusive of state regulation.
Id. at 136-37.
207 Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971); Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161
U.S. 275, 283 (1896). There is no conflict between the two acts in the sense of impossibility
of performance of both acts. See note 187 supra.
208402 U.S. 637 (1971).
209 402 U.S. at 649.
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effect the purpose of Congress.2 1 ° This premise, however, may propagate
confusion. It does not mean that a broad purpose is to be imputed to
the, Williams Act simply because it is remedial legislation, but only that
once the purpose is ascertained, it is to be given its full effect. The
problem is to define the Act's purpose.
In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.,211 the Supreme Court- said:
The purpose of the Williams Act is to insure that public shareholders
who are confronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be
required to respond without adequate information regarding the qualifications and intentions of the offering party. . . The Congress expressly disclaimed an intention to provide a weapon for management
to discourage takeover bids or prevent large accumulations of stock
which would create the potential for such attempts. Indeed, the
Act's draftsmen commented upon the "extreme care" which was
taken "to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of
management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid."2 12
210 See, e.g., Cattleman's Inv. Co. v. Fears, 343 F. Supp. 1248 (W.D. Okla. 1972)
where that court stated that "[t]he [Williams] Act is . . . a remedial statute and should
be interpreted liberally to carry out the legislative intent." Id. at 1251. The court went on
to add:
[It is a] familiar cannon [sic] of statutory construction that remedial legislation
should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes. The Securities Exchange Act
quite clearly falls into the category of remedial legislation.
Id., quoting Tcherepnin, v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967).
211422 U.S. 49 (1975).
212 422 U.S. 49, 58-9 (1975). The Court went on to hold that failure to file a schedule
13D on time, in the absence of a takeover attempt and of any actual harm to shareholders,
was not grounds for injunctive relief. Id. at 56, 65. It thus supported a line of cases in
which circuit courts had said that the Williams Act was not intended to provide management with tools to support their incumbency. Electronic Specialty Co. v. International
Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969); Butler Aviation Intl, Inc. v. Comprehensive
Designers, Inc., 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970); Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American
Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970). See also General Time Corp. v. American
Investors Fund, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). "The incumbent management
has no protected interest in remaining in power." Id. at 403. But cf. Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974), which said that the immediate purpose of the
Williams Act was to protect against corporate raiders and the time pressures tender offers
exercised on offerees. Id. at 597. A contrary view is that recent cases have been granting
injunctions for mere technical violations. Note, The Courts and the Williams Act: Try
a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 941 (1973).
It should be noted that Mosinee dealt with a violation of 13D, which only requires
disclosure after acquisition of 5% of a class of equity securities, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (19).
Unless the acquisition is a stepping stone for a tender offer, a tardy disclosure results in
little if any harm.
The short of the matter is that none of the evils to which the Williams Act
was directed has occurred or is threatened in this case. Petitioner has not-attempted to obtain control of respondent, either by a cash tender offer or any
other device. Moreover, he has now filed a proper Schedule 13D, and there
has been no suggestion that he will fail to comply with the Act's requirement ....
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 59 (1975).
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Thus, it may be said that the Williams Act had as its purpose the
promotion of tender offers within certain guidelines, and that a state
act which hinders tender offers to a greater extent conflicts with that
purpose and is preempted.
In a footnote to the Mosizee opinion, the Court did come close to
saying that Congress favored tender offers, saying:
[T]he Report also recognized "that takeover bids should not be discouraged because they serve a useful purpose
in providing a check on
2 13
entrenched but inefficient management.
It should be recognized that the Court overstated the point of the Senate
Report, which was, in fact, considerably more equivocal about the value
of tender offers. 21 4 The legislative history does not establish that Congress
favored tender offers ;2'5 nor does it show that Congress wished to promote them. Rather, Congress simply recognized the strong current of
opinion favoring little or no tender offer regulation. The congressional
view on tender offers is embodied in the Williams Act. Any ambiguities
in the Report indicate that although Congress was aware of the conflicting attitudes toward tender offer regulation, it took no position on
tender offers other than that taken in the Williams Act itself.21 The
Williams Act deals with disclosure and investor protection, and takes
no positive steps to promote tender offers.21 Before the Indiana Act is
preempted on the ground that it discourages tender offers, there should
213 422 U.S. at 58, n.8.

214 It was strongly urged during the hearings that takeover bids should not be
discouraged because they serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched
but inefficient management. It was also recognized that these bids are made for
many other reasons, and do not always reflect a desire to improve the management of the company.
S. REP. 550, supra note 158, at 3. The House Report was similar, omitting only the word
"strongly." H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967), reprinted in [1968J U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2811, 2813.

215 During floor debate on the Wililams Act, Sen. javits expressed the thought that
tender offers should not be condemned, because "Sometimes stockholders do very well
because of tenders, especially competitive tenders." Sen. Williams assured him that there
was no intent in the bill to prohibit tender offers and added, "I think it might encourage
them." 313 CONG. REc. 24665 (1967). It would seem that if the bill's sponsor had wanted
to promote tender offers, he would have been far less
2 16
See H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. Nicholson File Co.,
"Little in the legislative history suggests that Congress
plight of frustrated tender offerors or, for that matter,

equivocal in his reply.
482 F.2d 421, 423 (1st Cir. 1973):
was motivated by concern for the
the incumbent management of the

target."
217 "The takeover bid bill was designed to put cash tender offers and other block
acquisitions on the same footing as proxy contests for control. It was not intended either
to encourage or discourage such offers or acquisitions . . . ." SEC, 34T ANNuAL RFPORT
10 (1969). See generally, Note, Federal Pre-emption of State Laws: The Effect of Regulatory Agency Attitudes on Judicial Decisionmaking, 50 IN. L.J. 848 (1975).
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be more evidence of a congressional purpose to promote tender offers
than in fact there is.21
Although the Indiana Act need not be preempted because it may
discourage tender offers, it may be preempted nonetheless if it disrupts
a congressionally established balance of regulation.2 19 There is fairly
conclusive evidence that Congress intended in the Williams Act to preserve the balance of power between offeror and management. 220 The
Senate Report accompanying the Williams Bill stated:
The committee has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the balance
of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person
making the takeover bid. The bill is designed to require full and fair
disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing
and management equal opportunity to fairly present their
the offeror
22 1
case.

This may be taken to mean that Congress wished to establish affirmatively a then-existing balance of power. Another indication that
Congress established a balance is the abandonment of a section of the
original bill that would have required advance filing by the offeror. '
This provision was seen as certain to impose an undesirable burden
on potential offerors. 225 Any state law interfering with such a congressionally established balance between offeror and target would frustrate
the purpose of Congress and would be preempted.
Given that the purpose of the Williams Act was to maintain a
balance of power between the offeror and target companies, in order to
avoid preemption the Indiana Act must not upset this congressionally
adopted balance. However, since the Williams Act establishes only minimum standards," 4 there is no indication that a state may not more
enthusiastically protect shareholders, so long as the congressionally
218
See
2 19

note 215 supra.
See note 187 supra and text accompanying. A conflict between the two statutes
would exist if the effect of the state statute were to prevent the full effectuation of the
purposes of the federal statute, which may include the maintenance of a balanced system
of regulation in the area of tender offers. See Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 120
(1965); Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1396); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheaton) 1, 210-11 (1824).
220A balance of this sort can be established without specific statutory language
declaring that it has been struck. Cf. notes 216-17 supra and text accompanying.
221 S. REP. 550, supra note 158, at 3. When Sen. Williams first introduced the Williams
Act, he remarked, "I have taken extreme care with this legislation to balance the scales
equally to protect the legitimate interests of the corporation, management, and sharewithout unduly impeding cash takeover bids." 113 CONG. REc. 854 (1967).
holders
222
See SzcuRnms LAw-FRAUD, supra note 5, § 6.3; Cohen, supra note 5, at 152-53.
228 See SEcuarriEs LAw-FRAUD, supra note 5, § 6.3; Cohen, supra note 5, at 152-53.
224

See discussion in text accompanying notes 16 (disclosure), 17 (advance notice),
and 21 (pro rata acceptance), where it is shown that no impossibility of performance
exists between the two acts.
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created balance between the offeror and target is substantially pre,
served." 5 Moreover, although Congress recognized that broader disclosure would be a burden on the offeror, such disclosure may be justified by the benefits which will accrue to the shareholders.a It follows
that the Indiana Act must be analyzed from two aspects. First, does the
Indiana Act upset the balance created by the Williams Act? Second, if
this balance is indeed upset, is the burden on the offeror justified by some
substantial benefits which accrue to the shareholders?
One area of conflict between the two statutes creating a possible
imbalance is in the review and enforcement process.22 7 Since the SEC
has merely a rulemaking function under the 1934 Act, the Williams
Act must be judicially enforced.22 Resort to judicial enforcement,'"
2 25

While the bill may discourage tender offers . . . [by those] who are unwilling

to expose themselves to the light of disclosure, the committee believes this is a
small price to pay for adequate investor protection.
S. REP. No. 550, supra note 158, at 3-4.
The quotation above from the Senate report indicates that some burden on tender offers
could nonetheless be justified by the protection the provisions give investors. Perhaps,
then, many of the provisions of the Indiana Act which so severely burden the offeror can
be justified
on the basis of the benefits accruing to investors.
22
6 See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in [1968] U.S. Cooz
CoxG. & AD. Nr-ws 2811, 2813; note 43, supra. Therefore, in addition to seeking to strike
a balance between offeror and target, Congress was also willing to justify its regulation
on the basis of investor protection. Consequently, 'even if the regulation by the state
disrupts the congressionally created balance, the state statute might survive preemption
analysis purely by its protection of investors. In other words, it may not be enough to
simply say that the state regulation disrupts the balance in order to strike it down under
the preemption theory. If the state act complies with the spirit of the Williams Act, by
imposing a burden on the offeror or the target that is strongly justified by investor protection,
22 the disruption of the balance may be irrelevant.
7 See discussion in the text acompanying notes 25-38, supra.
228At trial, most plaintiffs now seek injunctive relief, which requires a showing of
probable success on the merits and irreparable harm. Sonesta Intl Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2nd Cir. 1973). See also Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975) rezbg, 500 F.2d lol (7th Cir. 1974) (reversing the
lower court decision that irreparable harm was not needed for injunctive relief against
a technical -violation); Ozark Air Lines, Inc. v. Cox, 326 F. Supp. 1113, 1119 (E.D.Mo.
1971). Some courts have used a "balancing of the equities" approach instead of the irreparable harm requirement. See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 803-04
(2nd Cir. 1969); Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960, 973
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (the hardships on the offerees considered the central concern in weighing
the equities). However, for a criticism of the above standard for injunctive relief, see Note,
Judicial Control of Cash Tender Offers-A Few Practical Recommendations, 50 IND. L.J.
114, 129-30 (1974). In addition, for a possible solution to the problems, see id. at 137-41.
229
The opinions of the many courts that have ruled on the Williams Act have
varied. For a discussion of the conservative position assumed by the early courts, see
Binder, The Securities Law of Contested Tender Offers, 18 N.Y.L.F. 569, 636-41 (1973);
Try a Little Tenderness, supra note 5, at 1000-05. The courts cited three basic reasons
for the conservative view of the Williams Act. 1) In the Williams Act, Congress required
only generalized disclosure, not disclosure burdensome to the offeror of a legitimate offer.
2) The Williams Act was not meant to be a mere tool for incumbent management. Try a
Little Tenderness, supra note 5, at 1002-03. For example, the court in Electronic Specialty
Co. v. Int'l Control Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2nd Cir. 1969), said:
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however, has posed two problems. On the one hand, the courts have
been unable to fashion a suitable remedy, since the harm to the parties
will have accumulated during the progress of the lawsuit2 so On the
On the other hand, we do not mean at all that interlocutory relief should be
given lightly. To the contrary, district courts must be vigilant against resort to
the courts on trumped-up or trivial grounds as a means for delaying and thereby
defeating legitimate tender offers.
Id. at 947.
3) A suitable remedy is often very difficult to develop in tender offer litigation, especially
during the later stages of the offer. In Electronic Specialty, for example, the court
also said,
To afford an opportunity for withdrawal would be the idlest of gestures now,
since ELS [Electronic Specialty] stock purchased by ICC [Int'l Control] at $39
is selling around $26-$27, and compulsory rescission is out of the question.
Divestiture of 1,200,000 shares of ELS probably would involve certain and huge
loss. Even if ICC could find a purchaser at the present market, the amount of
loss would approach $15,000,000. If the stock had to be sold in small quantities
over a period, ICC would likely suffer still greater loss and the prospect would
hang heavy over the nontendering stockholders of ELS. Permanent deprivation
of voting rights and an injunction against the solicitation of proxies would be
just as detrimental.
Id. at 947-48.
However, in recent cases the courts have given the statute a more liberal interpretation. Note, Judicial Control of Cash Tender Offers-A Few Practical Recomnendations,
50 IND. L.J. 114, 130-41 (1974); Try a Little Tenderness, supra note 5, at 1005-11. Cf.
Texasguf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 420-21 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (disclosure of material information is required; materiality is judged by the value of information to a reasonable prototype investor, Le., if, had the information been available
in proper form, a prototype investor would have made a contrary decision); Sonesta Int'l
Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Associates, 483 F.2d 247, 251 (2nd Cir. 1972) (requiring disclosure of contingent events which have a good possibility of success); Corenco Corp. v.
Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 939, 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 488 F.2d 207 (2nd
Cir. 1973) (disclosure not restricted to information specifically enumerated in § 13(d) of
the Williams Act). In Corenco, the offeror's testimony was very revealing. He withheld
information, "simply [because] we want people to tender their stock. . . ." Id. at 949.
The more liberal view of the Williams Act is supported on three grounds. First, the
acceptance of a tender offer in violation of the Williams Act is an illegal act by the
offerees, and injunctive relief is needed to prohibit the opportunity for illegality. Try a
Little Tenderness, supra note 5, at 1008. Cf. Gulf & Western Ind., Inc. v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973). Second, injunctive relief at the preliminary stages of an offer is less costly for all parties, even though it may in many
cases block the offer. Id. at 1009. Finally, a view like that taken in Electronic Speciatythat no relief can be granted even after a clear violation-is in plain conflict with the
purpose of Congress in passing the Williams Act. Id. at 1012-13. But see Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975) (injunctive relief for a mere technical violation denied),
for the most recent Supreme Court interpretation. The Mosinee case can be distinguished,
however, from typical tender offer litigation. See the text accompanying note 212, supra.
S2ao Since recent courts have been more favorably inclined to grant relief for technical
violations, see note 229, supra, the view that the courts have been unable to give adequate
relief is no longer as valid as was the case in the early 1970's. See Try a Little Tenderness,
supra note 5, at 1007-11.
On the other hand, some recent decisions, in order to allow the offer to go forward
and to facilitate divestiture, have instituted hold separate orders. These orders require the
offeror, after successful completion of the tender offer, to hold and maintain the target
company as a separate, viable, and going concern. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v.
Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2nd Cir. 1974); Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal, Inc., 403 F. Supp.
579 (W.D.Pa. 1975); 1CM Realty v. Cabot, Cabot & Forbes Land Trust, 378 F. Supp.
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other hand, even if the suit arises during the early stages of the offer,
the delay caused by the trial is often sufficient to discourage even the
most scrupulous tender offerors.2 3 ' Indeed, this delay has made the lawsuit a favorite defensive tactic. 28 2 As a result, judicial enforcement of

the Williams Act has generally proved to be either too little or too late.
The disclosure requirements of the Indiana Act, on the other hand,
offer more effective protection of shareholders. The Indiana Act is
administratively enforced by the Securities Commissioner, a procedure
which has several important effects. First, since the hearings are held
before the offer becomes effective, a remedy can more effectively be
developed to suit the violation .2 ' For example, if the violation is in some
minor detail, the offeror can easily correct it, since the offer is still ineffective. No one will have been hurt by the improper disclosure, and
the corrected offer can then proceed on schedule. 2 " Similarly, under the
provisions governing appeals from the Commissioner's ruling, a scrupulous offeror is protected from appeals interposed merely to impede the
progress of a fair offer. 235 Moreover, the hearings ordered by the Commissioner can be conducted in a few days, minimizing the delay arising
918 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Maryland Cas. Co. v. American General Ins. Co. 232 F. Supp. 620
(D.D.C. 1964).
In addition, one commentator has recommended what he calls a "conditional injunction" as a solution for the severity and time delay problems inherent in injunctive relief.
The idea is that an offeror who improperly discloses would be enjoined conditionally,
the condition being his failure to properly amend his disclosure. If he amends the disclosure to comply with the guidelines of the Williams Act, say, then the injunction is
lifted and the offer resumes. Note, Judicial Control of Cash Tender Offers-A Few
Practical Recommendations, 50 IND. L.J. 114, 130 (1974). This is remarkably similar to
the review under the Indiana Act, since the Commissioner's ruling is delivered early, at
a time when amendment with substantial harm is still relatively easy.
231 Try a Little Tenderness, supra note 5, at 1012-13. See the text accompanying notes
234-36,
infra.
232
For a discussion of the use of a lawsuit as a defensive tactic, see Hayes & Taussig,
supra
note 5, at 146; Schnndtz & Kelly, supra note 5, at 129-30.
23 3
See notes 228-30 supra.
234 Compare this result with the problems in Otis Elevator Co. v. United Technologies
Corp. 405 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), supra note 4. United made several revisions of its
offer during the litigation, contributing to the confusion to which Otis most objected.
Under the Indiana Act, United could have obtained a quicker iuling on the offer and its
amendments. More importantly, the offer would still have been ineffective during the
hearing process, so that all the revisions of the offer would not have so confused the
stockholders.
235 Under IND. CODE § 23-2-3-11 (Burns Supp. 1976), the ruling of the Commissioner
at the end of the hearings remains in effect during the appeal process. Although the Act
allows the circuit or superior court to stay the ruling under proper circumstances, the
language clearly indicates that the ruling should not normally be stayed by the reviewing
courts. Indeed, the Indiana Act eliminates the power to stay the Commissioner's ruling.
Moreover, the amendments give the Commissioner's ruling the status of prima-fade evidence
in the appeal. Consequently, when the Commissioner rules that the disclosure is sufficient,
an appeal of his ruling will not further slow the progress of the offer. Thus, a ruling on the
disclosure can be delivered at an early date without giving the target company an easy
weapon to continually delay a legitimate offer. See note 230 supra.
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from litigation. 286 The Indiana Act can therefore provide speedy and
effective enforcement of tender offer disclosure regulations. If the review process is properly conducted, the offeror will not be burdened
severely. As a result, the Indiana Act may be more effectively enforced
than the Williams Act, while substantially preserving the balance intended by Congress. The offeror is subjected to the scrutiny of independent review by the Securities Commissioner, thus xelieving the target company and the offerees of much of the burden of prosecuting
possible violations; nonetheless, the offeror will in turn benefit from
quicker initial rulings on the adequacy of the disclosure and the additional protection from appeals designed solely to delay the offer. Thus,
the offeror is both burdened and benefited in a way which maintains
the congressionally-intended balance, while further protecting shareholders. Consequently, no preemption problem should arise because the
balance has been maintained.
However, unlike the Williams Act, the Indiana Act requires more
than just fair disclosure. The Commissioner has the power to determine
if the offer is fair and equitable.2 7 Beyond the effect substantive review
2386 Under IND. CoDE § 23-2-3-2(e-f) (Burns Supp. 1976), the review and hearing
process could take a very long time. See notes 25-32 supra and text accompanying. The
Act merely establishes the maximum period of time the process can remain dormant.
However, the Commissioner can expedite the process through his own energetic efforts.
For example, in the United Technologies' bid for Otis Elevator stock, see note 4 supra,
Commissioner Hafsten moved the hearing process on a rapid schedule. Instead of waiting
twenty days for Otis, the target company, to demand a hearing, the Commissioner issued
a cease and desist order one day after the offer was announced. The hearing began five
days later, and a ruling was delivered on Oct. 27, just twelve days after the announcement.
This type of energetic action from the Commissioner will minimize the criticism that the
Indiana Act eliminates the advantage of speed. However, instead of depending on the
efforts of the Commissioner, Indiana should amend the Act to reduce the dormant periods
between filing, hearing order, the hearing, and the ruling to levels which will not allow
the Indiana Act to be a mere tool for delaying legitimate tender offers.
237IND. CODE §23-2-3-2(e)
(Burns Supp. 1976). See notes 25-32 supra and text
accompanying (discussion of enforcement of this provision); notes 227-32 supra and text
accompanying (discussion of effect of § 2(e) on balance between offeror and target company). This review provision can be seen as an extension of similar powers exercised under
the state securities laws. Although Indiana has no identical provision for review of registration statements, IND. CODE § 23-2-1-7(a) (1) (Burns Supp. 1976) contains a general
prohibitien against fraudulent acts or violations of IwD. CODE. § 23-2-1-1 et seq. (Burns
1971) in the registration statements, other states give the commissioners power to regulate
the substantive fairness of the offer. See In the Matter of the Proposed Exchange Offer
by Northwest Industries, Inc. of Certain Debentures, Preferred Stock, and Warrants to
Holders of Shares of Common Stock of the B.F. Goodrich Company, File No. 24040 (Ohio
Dep't of Commerce, Div. of Sec. May 1, 1969) CCH BLUE SxY L. REP'. 70,816; Release
of Wisconsin Office of Commissioner of Securities, CCH BLuE SKY L. REP. 70,805 (Feb.
10, 1969) (where the Wisconsin Securities Commissioner ruled that General Host's offer
was unfair and blocked its application to Wisconsin shareholders, because the financial
statements of General Host indicated that it would have difficulty servicing the debt and
preferred stock payments on the securities Armour's (the target) shareholders would
receive in the exchange).
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of the offer may have on the balance of power between the offeror and
target,28 8 such a review frustrates the policy underlying the Williams
Act. That policy demands disclosure of information sufficient to enable
the shareholders to make an intelligent decision; the shareholder, however, remains the final arbiter of the economic worth of the offer.28
Since the Commissioner may deny effectiveness to an offer which he
believes unfair to the shareholders, the Act may deny shareholders the
right, preserved under the Williams Act, to judge the ultimate value of
the offer. Therefore, although the review process may not in fact disrupt the balance of power established by Congress, it nevertheless conflicts with the Williams Act at least in spirit. As a result, this provision
should be amended so as to coalesce with the federal scheme, which
emphasizes the rights of the shareholders as arbiters of the offer.
A second group of provisions which may disrupt the balance of
power between the parties is that which regulates the timing"4 of the
tender offer. 24' Despite the shareholder benefits that additional time
However, the justification for the regulation of the substantive fairness under state
securities laws is territorial, while the Indiana Act proposes to have extraterritorial powers.
Thus, a more powerful justification for the substantive review by the Indiana Commissioner is the doctrine of internal affairs. See generally notes 78-91 supra and text accompanying.
8
23 The review of the substantive fairness of the offer by the Commissioner may tip
the balance intended by the Williams Act in two ways: (1) only the actions of the
offeror are reviewed for the fairness to the offerees, while no review of the action of
the target company is made; and (2) if the process becomes a long, fact finding review,
the delay from the hearings will eliminate one of the offeror's last advantages-speed.
That delay will benefit target company management and burden the offeror.
2397Te intent of Congress was not to make the decision for the stockholder, but to
provide him with all the "material" information he would need to make his own decision.
Note, Judicial Control of Cash Tender Offers-A Few PracticalRecommendations, So Iv.
L.J. 114, 122 (1974). Cf. SacuaprEs LAw-FnAuD, supra note 5; Try a Little Tenderness,

supra note 5, at 998-1000 (discussion of inequitable distribution of information). The
purpose was to correct the unequal distribution of information so that the offeree, not
the government, could make the decision.
240 See note 17 supra. For a good discussion of the importance of time to a cash offer,
see Note, Judicial Control of Cash Tender Offers-A Few Practical Recommendations,
50 Iwo. L.J. 114, 119-22 (1974). As a thumbnail guide on the average speed of tender

offers, an old study indicated the median period is seventeen days. Hayes & Taussig, supra
note 5, at 141. In addition, the New York Stock Exchange Company Manual A-180 suggests preferred timing schedules. "While it is desirable that a period of about 30 days be
used, a tender offer should remain open for a minimum of 10 days, so that all stockholders, even though they live at a distance, will have ample opportunity to learn of the
tender offer and to tender the shares." As quoted in Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v.
Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267, 275, n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
241The New York Stock Exchange claimed that the advance filing requirement in
state statutes would cause severe disruption in the trading of the stock of the target
company. Therefore, the exchange wished to be exempted from state laws. See 1 BNA Sac.
RE. & L. RFP. A-l1, A-11-12 (June 4, 1969). The motive for this was probably not
that the advance notice is such a disruptive factor, but that the Exchange did not wish
to comply with the numerous state laws which are more far reaching than the federal
provisions. Tender offers, by nature, disrupt trading in the target company. The advance
notice requirement at most simply prolongs for a few days this disruption. On the other
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might provide, 242 "speed is an asset of the offeror which the [Williams]
Act does not dislodge. '2 43 The Williams Act conspicuously omits any
advance notice 244 requirement and contains weaker withdrawal2 45 or

pro rata acceptance 246 provisions. The Indiana Act, on the other hand,
requires advance notice of an offer 247 and imposes both liberal withdrawal 248 and pro rata acceptance 249 requirements. An advance notice
requirement is certainly no new provision, since it was incorporated in
the registration provisions of the 1933 Act. 250 However, advance notice
requirements were discussed at length in the enactment of the Williams
Act.251 The rejection of this provision is strong evidence that Congress
felt that advance notice filing was detrimental to tender offers. Congress
could also have determined that imposition of an advance notice requirement on offerors would shift the balance too much in favor of target
companies. In other words, the objection may not have been to the
principle of advance notice, but rather to its effect on the balance of
power. If that be the case, then Indiana may impose an advance notice
requirement, so long as the balance is maintained.
In general, an advance notice provision will tip the balance in favor
of the target company, since the chief advantages of the offeror, speed
and surprise, are thereby eliminated.25 2 Professor Branson offers evihand, with the advance notice, the offer can be conducted at a slower pace, with less
need for wild, spontaneous accusations from the parties. Each party will have sufficient
time to prepare informative arguments in support of their positions and take their claims
to the Commissioner. In any event, Britain has adopted a slower approach to the timing
issue without any significant increase in disruption. See notes 252-53 infra. During the
hearing process, Congress reviewed an advance filing provision, but that provision was
never included in the final notice. Hayes & Taussig, supra note 5, at 145. Such a view is
very strong, evidence that any state advance filing provision may in fact conflict with
the Williams Act and be preempted by it. On the other hand, Congress may simply have
felt that an advance notice requirement in the Williams Act would tip the balance too
much in favor of the target. Thus, the objection may not have been against the principle
of advanced filing, but only its applications under the Williams Act.
2 42
See Bromberg, supra note 3, at 662-63 (the swiftness with which tender offers are
conducted makes the protection supposedly provided by the withdrawal and pro rata
rights under the Williams Act virtually useless). But see Try a Little Tenderness, supra
note 5, at 999 (the safeguard does not protect the offerees).
243 Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267, 275
n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See note 241 supra (Congress rejected a prior notice provision).
244 See note 124 supra.
245 See note 126 supra.
246 see note 127 supra.
2 47
See note 124 sura and text accompanying.
24
8 See note 126 supra and text accompanying.
249 See note 127 supra and text accompanying.
250 § 8, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1971).
2 51
See note 222 supra.
2 52
See Hayes & Taussig, supra note 5, at 145; Commerce Clause Limitations, supra
note 5, at 1169. But see, Branson, supra note 5. Although British takeover legislation does
not require advance notice disclosure, the offeror is required to keep his offer open for at
least twenty-one days. The legitimate tender offers are not adversely affected by the passage
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dence that some delay will not discourage legitimate, fair tender offers.
Under British law, for example, although advance notice is not required,
the offer must be kept open for at least 21 days. Branson notes that the
21-day rule has not discouraged tender offers in Britain. Indeed, tender
offers are viewed more favorably there than in the United States, because there is less pressure on shareholders to make a hasty decision
based on little information.2 53
Under the Indiana provisions, target management has adequate
time to prepare useful studies and analyses of the future of the target
and its present market value. The offeror will also be able to amend the
terms of the offer without the confusion that normally attends such
amendments, since the offer will not yet be effective. 54 In this sense, the
Indiana Act may offer the benefits of the British practice, with everything done under much less pressure.
The delay provisions, however, do handicap the offeror in practical terms, so much so that it may be doubtful that these provisions can
survive preemption analysis, even in light of the benefits to the investing public. Perhaps by imposing counterbalancing restraints on the
target management, the Indiana legislature could preserve the delay
provisions which are of great importance to shareholders, without unreasonably tipping the scales against the offeror contrary to the congressional scheme. The actions of incumbent management may be restrained, for example, so as to offset the burdens imposed by the timing
provisions on the offeror, and to enhance investor protection. Preserving the balance between offeror and target need not mean preserving
the precise regulatory scheme chosen by Congress. Although the Indiana
Act as it stands offers excessive tactical advantage to incumbent management, 255 an amendment of the -Act incorporating restrictions on the
target's use of defensive tactics, 256 the adoption of strict standards for
injunctive relief, and an expeditious and even-handed hearing system
of a few days. Branson, supra note 5, at 724-25. The burden on the less bona fide offers
is a small price to pay for the benefits that will accrue to the offerees by the extra time.
Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2811 (the House report said the burden of disclosure to the offeror who is
afraid to subject his terms to the light of disclosure is a small price to pay for investor
protection.) In addition, advance filing of disclosure statements is required for registration
of securities. Securities Act of 1933 § 8(a), 15 U.S.C. 77h(a) (1970). The registration of
securities has not only protected investors, but also enhanced the public confidence in the
securities industries. 113 CONG. Rlc. 24664 (Sen. Williams Comments).
25
3 Branson, supra note 5.
254
See note 234 sura.
255
See notes 162-73 supra and text accompanying.
256
See notes 178-81 supra and text accompanying.
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would not only further increase the protection of shareholders, but would
also maintain the congressionally-adopted balance of power.
There is some evidence that Congress anticipated state legislation
in this field. At the time the Williams Act was enacted, Virginia had
already adopted its own statute in the area.257 Congress may have
adopted a neutral position in the contest between the offeror and management precisely because it was unsure what effect federal legislation
would have on tender offers. Congress has been sensitive to the impact
of the Williams Act, as evidenced by the 1970 Amendments."5 It is consistent with this tentative congressional attitude to allow the states to
perform a laboratory function in an unsettled area. Although Congress
is free to bar state participation, i may also profit from the experience
of states which adopt modified tender offer schemes, and amend the
federal scheme accordingly. This suggests that state modification of the
national scheme for the regulation of tender offers should not fall victim
to preemption, and that the Indiana Act, at least if modified as herein
proposed, would survive under the Supremacy Clause.2 59
CONCLUSION

Although the Indiana Business Takeover Act incorporates many
devices already used in the regulation of corporate power and of securities, the use of these devices creates constitutional difficulties for the
Act. Although other provisions of state corporation laws which control
power relationships have extraterritorial impact, because the Act regulates the sale of securities, its extraterritorial reach raises additional due
process issues. However, the proper analysis of this due process question
requires only that the state have an interest in legislating. That interest
in this case is the protection of shareholders of the target corporation
during the struggle for control over it. Conceptually, this can be viewed
as the regulation of corporate internal affairs, a traditional concern
of the states as regards corporations whose charters they issue. Where
the corporation has such extensive dealings within the state that it is
within the definition of a psuedo-foreign corporation, courts have
251 Code of Virginia § 13.1-528 et seq. (1950), effective March 5, 1968. CCH BLUE
Sxy L. REP. 49,228. The Williams Act was not passed until July 29, 1968. See note 42
supra. "But Congress, embroiled in controversy over policy issues, rarely anticipates the
possible ramifications of its acts upon state laws." Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground,
supra note 194, at 209.
258 Pub. L. 91-567 among other things lowered the point at which a person's holdings
require the filing of Schedule 13D from 10% to 5%. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1971).
259 Courts probably will not do this. The enforcement of the Supremacy Clause is,
after all, the job of the courts. See Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground, supra note 194,

at 209-:10.
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allowed states to intervene in areas which are considered corporate
internal affairs. However, a state interest in the protection of its
citizen shareholders, as opposed to shareholders of its citizen corporations, is probably not sufficient to justify extraterritorial regulation.
The resolution of these issues is by no means clear, but the interests
of certainty and uniformity will be served if the Act is limited in its
application to corporations incorporated within the state of Indiana.
This is the traditional criterion for choice of laws problems, but
pseudo-foreign corporations have increasingly been subjected to the
laws of the forum state. A limitation of the application of the Act to
corporations incorporated in Indiana would alleviate both due process
and hard choice of laws problems.
Because the Act requires the transfer of corporate securities which
may take place in interstate commerce, it raises commerce clause problems. Most commentators would apparently agree that, as it stands,
the Act will inhibit commerce in these securities; this inhibition will
at the same time render meaningless many of the benefits which the
Act would provide shareholders. A modification of two features of the
Act is suggested. The first is to shorten the advance notice period to
a length of time which would provide the commissioner time to act
whenever necessary, and yet not provide the target company with so
much advance warning that defeat of the offer is inevitable. The
second is to restrict the defensive tactics available to the target corporation to those which will benefit shareholders and are not intended
solely to frustrate the offer.
Because of federal regulation of tender offers under the Williams
Act, there are also preemption problems. In part these are met by the
non-preemption section of the 1934 Act, which limits preemption to
cases of actual conflict. However, since the Williams Act's regulation
of tender offers establishes a balance between the parties, a state act
which disrupts this balance, as Indiana's Act does, would conflict and
be preempted. It is suggested that balance does not mean identity of
regulatory schemes, and if the Indiana Act can be modified so as to
weigh on target and offeror in roughly the same proportions as the
Williams Act, there would be no conflict. The changes suggested to
redress the commerce clause burdens will also apply here.
Finally, the Williams Act has not proved entirely satisfactory,
especially because it has spawned so much litigation. A system of advance
disclosure and administrative review could work much more smoothly
and keep tender offers out of the courts. The Indiana Act should be a
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step in the direction of speedy review of disclosure and steady progress
toward the resolution of a tender offer. As such, its operation should
be studied as a laboratory function rather than immediately be preempted.
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